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in and for the County of Bonneville 
HONORABLE JOEL E. TINGEY, District Judge. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, ESTATE of 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by 





Case No. CV-09-2767 
On the 11th day of January, 2011, a Pretrial Conference, 
Plaintiff's motion in limine re: Masterson came before the 
Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, in open court at Idaho 
Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Jeff Brunson and Mr. John Avondet appeared for and on 
behalf of the Plaintiff. 
Mr. David Alexander appeared on behalf of the Defendants. 
Mr. Avondet presented Plaintiff's motion in limine re: 
Masterson. Mr. Alexander presented argument in opposition to the 
motion in limine. Mr. Avondet presented rebuttal argument. 
The Court granted the motion in limine. Mr. Masterson will 
not be allowed to testify regarding the value of the business. 
236A 
He can testify about profits. 
Mr. Brunson presented Plaintiff's motion for sanctions. Mr. 
Alexander argued in opposition to the motion. Mr. Brunson 
presented rebuttal argument. Mr. exander presented further 
argument. 
The Court will not strike the pleadings. The Court will 
vacate the jury trial setting. The Court will take the motion 
for attorney fees under advisement. 
A scheduling conference will be scheduled in a few weeks. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
236 B 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the L{ day of January, 2011, I 
caused a true and correct copy the foregoing document to 
be delivered to the following: 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. Avondet 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 75495 
W. Marcus W. Nye 
David E. Alexander 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Deputy Court Clerk 
236 c 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
BONf-h , ·_E UUNT Y 





INC., an Idaho ) 
) 
KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, ESTATE of 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by 




11 JAN 11 All :05 
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 
STATUS CONFERENCE 
Case No. CV-09-2767 
Pursuant to Rule 16, I.R.C.P., it lS hereby ordered that a 
status conference be conducted by and between the Court and the 
counsel of record in regard to the above entitled case on February 
9, 2011, at 8:45 a.m. 
It is further ordered that at least one of the attorneys 
each party participating in 
to enter into stipulations 
matters that the parties 
discussed. (See Rule 16 (b) 
said status conference have authority 
and to make admissions regarding all 
may reasonably anticipate be 
and Rule 16 (c)) . Counsel shall also 
be prepared to furnish the Court with available dates for a pre~ 
trial conference and trial setting. 
The Plaintiff is directed to tiate the telephone 
conference call to the Court. The telephone number is 529-1350 
extension 1340. 
Dated this day of January, 2011 
236 D 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of January, 2011, that I 
mailed or hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document to the 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. Avondet 
lowing: 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-75495 
W. Marcus W. Nye 
David E. Alexander 
PO Box 1391 





Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P A 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Tel: (208) 523-5171 
Fax: (208) 529-9732 
Email: j eff@beardstclair. com 
javondet@beardstclair.com 
Attomeys for Plaintiff 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
VS. 
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its 
qualified personal representative, Kenneth 
Rammell, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No.: CV-09-2767 
ORDER RE: JANUARY 6, 2011 
HEARING 
This matter having come before the Court by means of the Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration, and hearing the parties' arguments and good cause having been found: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED and that the Plaintiff's 
constructive fraud claims in Count 3 of the Amended Complaint are reinstated consistent 
with the Court's findings as to Count 2 ofthe Amended Complaint. 
Order Re: January 6, 2011 Hearing Page 1 
236 F 
DATED: JanuaryL·Y, 2011. 
CLERK'S NOTICE OF ENTRY 
/ 
I certify that on January2£ 2011, I served a tme and conect copy of the 
ORDER RE: JANUARY 6, 2011 HEARING upon the following as indicated below: 
David Alexander 
Racine Olson Nye Budge Bailey 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-139 
Fax: 232-6109 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Fax: 529-9732 
Clerk of the ourt 
Wu.s. Mail [] Hand-Delivered 0 Facsimile 
~~.S. Mail D Hand-Delivered D. Facsimile 
236 G 
Order Re: January 6, 2011 Hearing Page 2 
Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P A 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7 495 
Tel: (208) 523-5171 
Fax: (208) 529-9732 
Email: jeff@beardstclair.com 
j avondet@beardstclair. com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
17 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 
Aptil Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, Case No.: CV-09-2767 
vs. 
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Cluista 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The 
Estate of Cluista Beguesse Rammell, by its 
qualified personal representative, Kermeth 
Rammel1, 
ORDER REGARDING JANUARY 11, 
2011 HEARING 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
This matter having come before the Comi by means of Plaintiff's Motion in 
Limine and Motion for Sanctions or, in the Altemative, for a Limited Continuance, and 
having heard arguments and good cause having been shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Plaintiff's motion in limine is granted. Mr. Masterson will not be allowed to 
testify regarding value of the business. Mr. Masterson will be allowed to testify 
236 H 
Order Regarding January 11, 2011 Hearing Page 1 
2. The cuiTent tiial set for January 25, 2011 is vacated and will be rescheduled at 
a date convenient to the Comt. Discovery will only be reopened on a limited basis to 
allow the Plaintiff to conduct discovery related to or mising out of the disclosure of the 
1999 estate planning documents and to allow the Plaintiff to potentially bring additional 
claims against the Defendants. The Court will take the motion for attomey fees under 
advisement. 
DATED: January '-Y, 2011. 
2361 
OrderRegardingJanuaryl1,2011 Heming Page 2 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I ce1iify that on J anuaryc2.8, 2011, I served a tme and correct copy of ORDER 
GRANTING MOTION FOR LIMITED CONTINUANCE upon the following as 
indicated below: 
David E. Alexander 
Racine Olson Nye Budge Bailey 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-139 
Fax: 232-6109 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A 
21 05 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Fax: 529-9732 
Clerk of the Court 
By: 1tJJLV 
Deputy Clerk 
a{ U.S. Mail D Hand-Delivered D Facsimile 
~U.S. Mail 0~ Hand-Delivered D Facsimile 
236 J 
Order Regarding January 11, 2011 Hearing Page 3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
1 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEJlLLfJB -g AlQ :56 









KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual) 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC. 1 an ) 
Idaho corporation, ESTATE of ) 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by ) 
Its qualified personal ) 
Representative, Kenneth ) 





ORDER AND NOTICE 
RESETTING JURY TRIAL 
Case No. CV-09-2767 
Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure/ 
the following pre-trial schedule shall govern all proceedings in 
this case: 
ORDER 
I. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. A Pre trial Conference is scheduled for September 13/ 
2011 at 8:30 a.m. 
2. Jury t al is scheduled for 10:00 a.m. on September 27, 
2011. Trial may go into a second week. In that case 
the second week trial will continue on Tuesday, 
October 4 1 2011. 
3. All deadlines remain in effect as outlined in the prior 
Order. 
DATED this~ day of February, 2011. 
236 K 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
a 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of February, 2011, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the ing document to 
be delivered to the following: 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. Avondet 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-75495 
W. Marcus W. Nye 
David E. Alexander 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204 1391 
ORDER 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 















Case No. CV-2009-2767 
MINUTE ENTRY 
February 10, 2011, a Defendant's Motion in Limine came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, in open Court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Comi Reporter, and Ms. Rhonda Quintana, Deputy Court Clerk, were 
present. 
Mr. Jeffrey D. Brunson appeared on behalf of the plaintiff. 
Mr. David E. Alexander appeared on behalf of the defendant. 
Mr. Alexander addressed the Court in support of the motion and presented argument 
The Court inquired of counsel regarding calculation of damages for the plaintiff. 
Mr. Alexander responded in clarification and offered further argument in support. 
Mr. Brunson offered argument in opposition to the motion. 
Mr. Alexander continued with argument in rebuttal. 
The Court denied the motion but reopened discovery. 
Mr. Brunson offered clarification regarding the deposition ofthe plaintiff regarding damages. 
The Court so noted and admonished counsel to mediate. 
236M 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Court was thus adjoumed. 
c: Jeffrey Brunson 
David Alexander 
MINUTE ENTRY • 2 
236 N 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 





KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual ) 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC. , an ) 
Idaho corporation, ESTATE of ) 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by ) 
Its qualified personal ) 





Case No. CV-09-2767 
On the 22nd day of March, 2011, Plaintiff's motion to 
consolidate came before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District 
Judge, in open court at Idaho ls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Jeff Brunson appeared on behalf of the Pla iff. 
Mr. David exander appeared on behalf of the Defendants. 
Mr. Brunson presented Plaintiff's.motion to consolidate. 
Mr. Alexander responded to the motion. Mr. Brunson presented 
rebuttal argument. 
The Court will take the matter under advisement and issue a 
decision as soon as possible. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
236 0 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
of , 2011, I I hereby certify that on the ~ 
caused a true and correct copy of t foregoing to 
delivered to the following: 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. Avondet 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-75495 
W. Marcus W. Nye 
David E. Alexander 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
RONALD LONGMORE 
)1M:-
=---~- ---~=-~---Deputy Court Clerk 
236 p 
BON L 
MAR 23 A10 :1 9 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C01JNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual, 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, THE ESTATE OF CHIRISTA 
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by it qualified 
personal representative, Kenneth Rammell, 
Defendants/Counterclaimant. 
Case No. CV-09-2767 
ORDER ON MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE 
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff's motion to consolidate this 
action with a probate action pending before the magistrate court. The Court, having 
reviewed the record and heard oral argument, and good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to consolidate is denied. The 
Parties are however put on notice that this Comi will notre-litigate issues addressed and 
determined by the magistrate court in the subject probate proceeding. 
Dated this 2.. ') day of March, 2011. 
ORDER ON MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE - 1 236 Q 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ~0 day of March, 2011, I did send a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon, or by placement in the courthouse mailbox. 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
BEARD ST.CLAIR GAFFNEY 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
David E. Alexander 
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
Clerk ofthe District Court 
B01meville County, Idaho 
By ~Yr\A/ 
Deputy Clerk 
ORDER ON MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE - 2 
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KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, ESTATE of 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by 





Case No. CV-09-27 
On the 21st day of April, 2011, Plaintiff's motion to amend 
complaint to add punitive damages came before the Honorable Joel 
E. Tingey, Dist ct Judge, open court at Idaho Falls, I 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Jeff Brunson appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
Mr. David Alexander appeared on behalf of the Defendants. 
Mr. Brunson presented Plaintiff's motion to amend complaint. 
Mr. Alexander responded to the motion. Mr. Brunson presented 
rebuttal argument. 
The Court will take the matter under advisement and issue a 
decision as soon as 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I he certify that on the L( day of April, 2011, I 
caused a true correct copy of regoi to 
delivered to the 11 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. Avondet 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-75495 
W. Marcus W. Nye 
David E. Alexander 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH Juf3fe1XL DisrrRfcT . 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




KE:N'NETH RAMMELL, an individual, 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, THE ESTATE OF CHIRISTA 
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by it qualified 
personal representative, Kenneth Rammell, 
Defendants/Counterclaimant. 
A8 :56 
Case No. CV-09-2767 
ORDER ON MOTION TO AMEND 
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint 
to include a claim for punitive damages. Following the hearing on the motion, the Court 
took the motion under advisement. Having reviewed the record, and weighed the 
evidence in the record, the Court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood of prevailing 
on a claim of fraud. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint to include a 
claim of punitive damages is granted. The Court reserves the right to make a 
dete1mination at a later date as to whether the issue of punitive damages will be 
submitted to the jury. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this "2--cday of April, 2011. 
ORDER ON MOTION TO AMEND - 1 236 u 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this J,,Aday of April, 2011, I did send a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon, or by placement in the courthouse mailbox. 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
BEARD ST.CLAIR GAFFNEY 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
David E. Alexander 
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
ORDER ON MOTION TO AMEND - 2 
Clerk of the District Court 






Jeflrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Tel: (208) 523-5171 
Fax: (208) 529-9732 
Email: jetf@beardstclair.com 
j avondet@beardstclair.com 
Attomeys for Plaintiff 
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DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its 
qualified personal representative, Kenneth 
Rammell, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-09-2767 
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
AND JURY DEMAND 
Plaintiff, April Beguesse, Inc., through its attorneys, alleges and complains 
against the Defendants as follows. 
PARTIES 
l. April Beguesse, Inc. (ABI) is an Idaho Corporation set up w1der the laws of 
the State ofidaho. 
2. Kenneth Rammell (Rammell) is an individual residing in Bonneville County, 
Idaho. 
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3. Christa Beguesse, Inc. (CBI) is an Idaho Corporation set up under the laws of 
the State ofidaho. 
4. The Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its personal representative, 
Kenneth Rammell, filed an application for infonnal probate in Bonneville County, Idaho 
on March 11, 2009, Case No. CV -09-1682. 
JURISDICTION AND VENlJE 
5. This Court has jurisdiction over the Defendants pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-
514. 
6. Bonneville County is the proper venue for this action under Idaho Code § 5-
404. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
7. In November 200 l, April Beguesse (April) was contacted by her mother, 
Christa Beguesse (Christa), regarding the possibility of April taking over Christa's 
business, CBL April traveled to Idaho Falls to discuss the possibility with Christa and 
Rammel!. 
8. CBI was in the type setting business. 
9. April believed that Christa was the sole owner of CBI. Christa had been 
running her business tor years before she married Rammel!. 
I 0. Rammel! and Christa were both oJTicers and directors in CBI. 
11. Rammell and Christa told April that she could purchase and take over the 
business. 
12. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI had a guaranteed self-
sustaining contract with a customer. 
13. Rammel! and Christa represented to April that CBI owned a library of 
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proprietary files valued at over $1,000,000. 
14. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI owned a proprietary 
software program unique to CBf's business. 
15. Rammell and Christa represented that CBI owned intellectual property 
16. Rammell and Christa indicated that they would sell the business for $12,000 a 
month for eight years. 
17. Rarnme11 stated that they were being very generous and that April would be a 
tool not to accept the offer. 
18. Initially, April worked Jor CBI as an employee. 
19. In November 2003, April formed ABJ. 
20. Both Rammell and Christa indicated on many occasions that the assets of CBI 
would be left to April when Christa died. 
21. In February 2004, ABI commenced making monthly payments to CBI for 
$12,000 month. 
22. AI3I took ownership of all past and current debts of CBI and started operating 
the business. ABI paid all the bills including the monthly rent to a third party. 
23. ABI purchased all new computers, printers, scanners, phone system, updated 
programs and hardware and updated the office furniture. 
24. Rammel] indicated that he had a contract that his brother had used for his 
business that Rammell had altered. 
25. Christa had Rammell remove a clause in the contract that stated in the case of 
Christa's death payments would continue. 
26. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI' s assets would be 
bequeathed to her after Christa died. 
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27. Rammell and Christa represented to April that the payments would cease after 
Christa's death. 
28. Rammel! and Christa repeatedly made the representations alleged in the 
previous paragraphs. 
29. Based on the representations of Rammell and Christa, April ultimately signed 
a document entitled "lease agreement''. The purported agreement is between Cl3I and 
ABI and made effective January 1, 2004. 
30. The purported agreement provides: 
BUSINESS AND EQUIP:tv1ENT. For and in consideration of the 
promises set forth in this Lease and the payment of the rents specified in 
this Lease, Lessor leases, demises and rents unto the Lessee, and Lessee 
leases, demises and rents from Lessor, that certain business described in 
Exhibit 'A' attached hereto (the 'Business"), that certain equipment 
described in Exhibit 'B' attached hereto. (Such business and equipment 
identified in Exhibits 'A' and 'B', shall collectively be refened to herein 
as 'the Property', unless otherwise indicated. 
31. Exhibits A and B attached to the purp011ed agreement were completely blank. 
32. The purported agreement required CBI to provide consulting services to ABI. 
33. ABI continued making monthly payments to CBI in an amount of $12,000 
until November 1, 2008. 
34. ABI also paid Christa for consulting and professional services. 
35. On November 10, 2008, Christa died. 
36. No will was discovered leaving CBI's assets to April. 
3 7. A holographic paragraph was produced by Rammell that states all of Christa's 
possessions go to Rammell. 
38. After visiting an attorney after her mother's death, April learned for the first 
time that the representations made by Rammel! and Christa alleged in the previous 
paragraphs were false. 
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39. There was no guaranteed contract with a major customeL Rather, the 
customer could leave at any time. 
40. The library referenced by Rammell and Christa is actually owned by the 
customer. 
41. The referenced proprietary software program was a software program that 
could be purchased off the shelf 
42. On March 1, 2009, April moved to Nevada. 
43. On March 11, 2009, Ramme!l applied for infonnal probate for Christa's estate 
in Bonneville County, Idaho, Case No. CV-09-1682. 
44. On Aprill3, 2009, Christa's estate on behalfofCBI filed a complaint against 
ABI and April individually in Clark County, Nevada, Case No. A587645. The Nevada 
complaint seeks to enforce the purported agreement. 
45. The Nevada case was dismissed. 
COUNT ONE: DECLARATORY RELIEF 
46. ABI incorporates and rcalleges all previous paragraphs. 
47. Critical portions to the purported lease contract between ABI and CBI were 
left blank. 
48. ABI and CBI did not form a lease contract because there was never mutual 
assent. 
49. ABI and CBI did not form a lease contract because the purported agreement is 
missing essential tenns. 
50. ABI and CBI never contemplated a lease of the business but rather 
contemplated a purchase of certain CBI assets. 
51. This Court has the power to declare that there is no lease contract between 
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ABI and CBI pursuant to Idaho Code§ 10-1201. 
52. AB I is an interested person as defined by Idaho Code § 1 0-1202. 
53. This Court should declare that: 
a. ABI is under no continuing obligation to make payments to CBI; 
b. Monies previously paid by ABI to CBI should be refunded to ABI; and 
c. There is no enforceable lease contract between ABI and CBL 
54. Alternatively, the lease contract should be refonned to meet the intent of 
parties. 
55. To the extent the Court finds an enforceable contract, the contract should be 
rescinded due to the defendants' fraudulent conduct and all monies paid should be 
refunded. 
56. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA in order to protect 
its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code §§ 12-120 
and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
COUNT TWO: FRAUD 
57. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs. 
58. The defendants acting individually and on behalf of CBI made numerous 
representations to ABI and April including but not limited to the following: 
a. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBl had a guaranteed se]f .. 
sustaining contract with a major customer. 
b. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI owned a library of 
proprietary files valued at over $1,000,000. 
c. Rammel! and Christa represented to April that CBI owned a proprietary . 
software program unique to CBI's business. 
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d. Rammel! and Christa represented that there was intellectual property 
unique to CBI. 
e. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBf' s assets would be 
bequeathed to her after Christa died. 
f Rammell and Christa represented to April that the payments would cease 
after Christa's death. 
59. The defendants failed to disclose that: 
a. There was no guaranteed contract and that the major customer could leave 
at any time for any reason. 
b. The library of proprietary tiles was in fact owned by the major customer 
and not CBL 
c. That the sofhvare program utilized by CBI could be purchased off the 
shelf. 
d. That CBI did not own any intellectual property. 
e. That Rammell was an owner of CBf. 
60. The statements and omissions of the defendants were false. 
61. The statements and omissions of the defendants were material. 
62. The defendants knew the statements and omissions \vere false. 
63. The defendants intended that ABI rely on the false statements and omissions. 
64. ABl and April did not know the statements and omissions were false. 
65. ABI relied on the statements and omissions by signing the purpOiied 
agreement and by paying $12,000 a month to CBI from February 2004 to November 
2008. 
66. Such reliance by ABf was justifiable. 
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67. As a result of the defendants' false statements and omissions, ABI has been 
damaged in an amount to be proven at triaL 
68. The defendants' conduct constitutes affirmative fraud, fraud by omission, and 
fraud in the inducement. 
69. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to protect 
its rights. I\BI is entitled to attomey fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code§§ 12-120 
and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
COUNTTHREE: CONSTRUCTIVEFRAUD 
70. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs. 
71. The defendants and AB I had a relationship of trust and confidence because 
Christa, Rammel!, and April were members of the same family and CBI and ABI were in 
contractual negotiations and ultimately signed an agreement. 
72. The defendants breached this relationship of trust and confidence. 
73. ABI is not required to establish that tl1e defendants' knew their statement and 
omissions \Vcre false or that the defendants intended ABI rely on their false statements 
and omissions. 
74. The defendants conduct constitutes constructive fraud. 
75. As a result of the defendants' conduct, ABI has been damaged in an amount to 
be proven at triaL 
76. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to protect 
its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney tees pmsuant to agreement, [daho Code§§ 12-120 
and I 2-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54. or any other statute or provision. 
COUNTFOUR: BREACHOFCONTRACT 
77. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs. 
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78. The defendants promised to sell or assign several assets of CBI to ABI in 
exchange for payment of $12,000/month. 
79. These assets include but are not limited to: 
a. a guaranteed contract with a major customer; 
b. a library of proprietary files valued at over a million dollars; 
c. a proprietmy software program unique to CBI's business; 
cl. other intellectual property. 
80. The paTties' exchange of promises constitutes a binding contract. 
81. ABI substantially perfonned its obligations under the contract and is not in 
material breach. 
82. The defendants materially breached the contract by failing to provide the 
agreed upon assets and failing to provide consulting services required under the contract 
83. The defendants conduct constitutes a failure of consideration. 
84. The defendants conduct also constitutes a breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. 
85. The defendants' material breaches are the direct and proximate cause of 
damages to ABI. 
86. l\Bl has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
87. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to protect 
its rights. AD! is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code§§ 12-120 
and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
COUNT FIVE: BREACH OF EXPRESS W ARRANTV 
88. ABI incmvorates and realleges all previous paragraphs. 
89. ABI and the clefendm1ts entered a contract for the sale of CBI's assets. 
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90. ABf substantially perfonned its obligations under the contract. 
91. As part of the contract the defendants expressly represented and warranted 
that CBI could transfer the following assets: 
a. a guaranteed contract with a major customer; 
b. a library of proprietary files valued at over a million dollars; 
c. a proprietary software program unique to CBI' s business; 
d. other intellectual property. 
92. This warTanty was a material term of the contract and its breach constitutes a 
material breach of the contract 
93. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-2-312, in evety contract for sale there is a 
wananty of title that the title is good and its transfer is rightfuL 
94. Pursuant to Idaho Code § § 28-2-313, 28-12-210, any affirmation oftact or 
promise made by the seller or lessor to the buyer or lessee, which relates to the goods and 
becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall 
confonn to the affirmation or promise. 
95. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-2-313, any description of the goods which is 
made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall 
confonn to the description. 
96. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-12-211, there is a warranty that no other person 
holds a claim to or interest in the goods. 
97. Contrary to the defendants' wananties, CBJ could not transfer the assets 
because such assets did not exist or were not owned by CBI and the assets transferred, if 
any, did not confonn. 
98. Tlle breach ofwmTanty is the direct and proximate cause of damages to ABL 
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99. ABI has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at triaL 
100. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to 
protect rts rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code § § 
12- i 20 and 1 i 21, Tdaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
COUNT SIX: BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY 
I 0 J . ABI incorporates and rea!leges all previous paragraphs. 
102. ABI and the defendants entered a contract for the sale of CBI' s assets. 
103 ABJ substantially perfom1ed its obligations under the contract. 
l 04. As part of the contract the defendants impliedly warranted that CBI could 
transfer the following assets: 
a. a guaranteed contract with a major customer; 
b. a library of proprietary files valued at over a million dollars; 
c. a proprietary software program unique to CBJ's business; 
d. other intellectual property. 
I 05. This \Vananty was a material tem1 of the contract and its breach 
constitutes a material breach of the contract. 
106. As part of the contract, the defendants impliedly warranted that the assets 
to be transferred would be merchantable, that is to say that it would pass without 
objection in the trade under the contract description; that it would be Jit for the ordinary 
purpose of such goods; and that it would conform to the promises or at1irmations of fact 
made. 
1 07. As part of the contract the defendants impliedly wananted that the assets 
was fit for a particular purpose, that is to say that the defendants knew the purpose for 
which ABI intended it and that the ABI was relying upon the defendants to fumish the 
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assets, and warranted thus impliedly warranted that the assets were suitable for that 
purpose. 
108. Contrary to the defendants' \Vananties, CBI could not transfer the assets 
because such assets did not exist or were not ovmed by CBI and such assets did not 
confom1 or were not suitable for ABI' s purposes. 
I 09. The breach of warranty is the direct and proximate cause of damages to 
ABL 
ll 0. ABI has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
1 I I. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA in order to 
protect its rights. ABf is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code §§ 
J 2-120 and 12-121, fdaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
COUNT SEVEN: UNJUST ENIRCHMENT 
112. ABf inc01vorates and realleges all previous paragraphs. 
113. ABI provided a bene tit to the defendants by paying $12,000 a month from 
February 2004 to November 2008. 
I 14. Because ABI did not get what was promised, it would be unjust for CBI to 
retain the benefit 
115. As a result of defendants' conduct, ABI has been damaged in an amount to 
be proven at trial. 
116. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffi1ey PA in order to 
protect its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code §§ 
12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Rule ofCivil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
COUNT EIGHT: QUASI-ESTOPPEL 
117. ABI incorporates and realleges all previous paragraphs. 
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1 J 8. The defendants took the position that April would no longer make any 
payments aJier Christa's death. 
119. Christa had Rammell remove a clause in the contract that stated in the case 
of Christa's death payments would continue. 
120. Rammell and Christa represented to April that CBI' s assets would be 
bequeathed to her after Christa died. 
121. Rammell and Christa represented to April that the payments would cease 
after Christa's death. 
122. On November I 0, 2008, Christa died. 
123. No will was discovered leaving CBI's assets to April or ABL 
124. A holographic paragraph was produced by Rammel! that states all of 
Christa's possessions go to Rammel!. 
125. ABI relied on the representations to its disadvantage. 
126. It would be unconscionable to allow the defendants to maintain the 
inconsistent position that payments were to continue after Christa's death. 
127. The defendants should be estopped from claiming that the payments must 
continue. 
128. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to 
protect its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code §§ 
12-120 and 12- I 21, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
COUNT NINE: PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
129. ABI incOJvorates and realJeges all previous paragraphs. 
I 30. The acts of the defendants constitute liability for fraud resulting from 
intentional, reckless, extreme, and outrageous conduct. 
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131. The defendaJ1ts acted fraudulently with their misrepresentations to ABI 
about \\'hether payments would cease upon Christa's death, representations made about 
the libnuy of files, representing the status of the alleged proprietmy software that was 
''transferTed'' to ABI as a part of the transaction, misrepresenting or failing to disclose the 
status of Ken Rammell's ovvnership interest in CBI, and their intentional failure to 
disclose and mislead ABI about the existence of vmious estate planning documents. 
132. As a result of liability, resulting from intentional, reckless, extreme, and 
outrageous conduct, ABI is entitled to an award of punitive damages in an amount to be 
determined at triaL 
133. ABI has been required to retain Beard St. Clair Gaffney PAin order to 
protect its rights. ABI is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to agreement, Idaho Code §§ 
I 2-120 and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
The Plaintiff prays for relief as ft1llows: 
I. Judgment against the defendants in an amount to be proven at trial. 
2. A declaration that: 
a. ABI is under no continuing obligation to make payments to CBf; 
b. Monies previously paid by ABI to CBJ should be refunded to ABI; and 
c. There is no enforceable lease contract between ABI and CBI. 
3. An order estopping the defendants from claiming payments should continue. 
4. An award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to agreement Idaho Code §§ 12-
120 and 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, or any other statute or provision. 
5. An award of punitive damages in an amount to be determined at triaL 
6. Any other relief the Court deems just and proper. 
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PURSUANT TO RULE 38 OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
PLAINTIFF DEMANDS TRIAL BY .JURY 
Dated: May 9, 201 L 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that lam an attorney licensed in the State ofidaho, have my otJice 
located in Idaho Falls, Idaho and on May 9, 2011, I served a true and cmTect copy of the 
Second Amended Complaint and Jmy Demand upon the following as indicated below: 
David E. Alexander 
Racine Olson Nye Budge Bailey 
POBox 1391 
Pocatello, rD 83 204-139 
Fax: 232-6109 
Bonneville County Courtl10use 
605 N Capital A venue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: 529-1300 
1 
fid; U.S. Mail IE.;]§ Hand-Delivered ~.~ Facsimile 
e:JJ U.S. Mail !Jd: Hand-Delivered ~Facsimile 
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Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
21 05 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Tel: (208) 523-5171 
Fax: (208) 529-9732 
Email: jeff@beardstclair.com 
j avondet@beardstclair.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNE~LLECOUNTYIDAHO 
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintift/Counterdefendant, Case No.: CV-09-2767 
vs. 
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa ORDER SHORTENING TIME 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its 
qualified personal representative, Kenneth 
Rammell, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
This matter having come before this Court by and through the Motion to Shorten 
Time, and good cause having been shown: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing on the Motion for Protective Order 
shall be heard on Tuesday, September 13, 2011 at 8:30a.m. 
DATED: September 7, 2011. 
Order Shortening Time Page 1 
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NO 9159 09/06/2011/TUE 03:05PM 
I 
t f 
# 8/ 9 
09-06-11 ;02.04PM; # 9/ 9 
RECE VE: 
CLERK'S NOTICE OF ENTRY 
I certify that on September+· 2011, I served a true and correct copy ofthe 
ORDER SHORTENING TIME on the following by the method of delivery designated 
below: 
David E. Alexander 
Racine Olson Nye Budge Bailey 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, lD 83204-139 
Fax: 232-6109 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
Beard St. Clair Gaffuey PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Fax: 529-9732 
Clerk of the Court 
D. U.S. Mail 0 Hand-delivered rzGacsimile 
0 U.S. Mail 0 Hand-delivered dFacsimi!e 
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Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Tel: (208) 523-5171 
Fax: (208) 529-9732 
Email: jeff@beardstclair.com 
javondet@beardstclair.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
' i E COUNTY 
''.PQ H~t i 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
vs. 
Kenneth Rarnrnell, an individual, Christa 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rarnrnell, by its 
qualified personal representative, Kenneth 
Rarnrnell, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No.: CV-09-2767 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through its counsel of record, Jeffrey D. 
Brunson and the law firm, Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A, and submits the following 
proposed jury instructions. 
Jeffre D Brunson 
John . A vondet 
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I am an attorney licensed in the State of Idaho, have my office 
located in Idaho Falls, Idaho and on September 8, 2011, I served a true and correct copy 
of PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS upon the following as indicated 
below: 
David E. Alexander 
Racine Olson Nye Budge Bailey 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-139 
Fax: 232-6109 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N Capital Avenue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: 529-1300 
. Brunson 
John M. A vondet 
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
t;;J; U.S. Mai~nd-Delivered liJ\ Facsimile 
IDJI 1.20.1 -Burden of proof- preponderance of evidence 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or 
use the expression "if you fmd" or "if you decide," I mean you must be 
persuaded that the proposition is more probably true than not true. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- --
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
One of the named defendants in this case is The Estate of Christa Beguesse 
Rammell. Statements made by Christa Beguesse Rammell are attributable to 
The Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell for purposes of tins trial. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other 
IDJI 1.20.2- Burden of proof- clear and convincing evidence 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by clear 
and convincing evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is highly 
probable that such proposition is true. This is a higher burden than the 
general burden that the proposition is more probably true than not true. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other 
IDJI 1.22 -Deposition testimony (Modified) 
INSTRUCTION NO.4 
Certain evidence is about to be presented to you by deposition. A 
deposition is testimony taken under oath before the trial and preserved in 
writing. This evidence is entitled to the same consideration you would give 
had the witness testified from the witness stand. 
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is 
a record of the testimony you are about to hear, this record will not be 
available to you during your deliberations. 
Comment: 
The last sentence has been added to IDJI 124 to anticipate inquiry from the jury. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --
IDJI 1.24.1 -Circumstantial evidence without definition 
INSTRUCTION NO.5 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. The law makes no 
distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a 
reasonable method of proof and each is respected for such convincing force 
as it may carry. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- --
IDJI 1.28 - Evidence admitted for limited purpose 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
In this case, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. I called your 
attention to this when the evidence was admitted. I remind you that whenever evidence 
was admitted for a limited purpose, you must not consider such evidence for any purpose 
other than the limited purpose for which it was admitted. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other ---
IDJI 4.60 -Fraud- issues 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following 
propositions by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. That the defendant stated a fact to the plaintiff; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. The defendant either knew the statement was false or was 
unaware of whether the statement was true at the time the statement was 
made. 
5. The plaintiff did not know that the statement was false; 
6. The defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the 
statement and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. The plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the statement; 
8. The plaintiffs reliance was reasonable under all the 
circumstances; 
9. The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by 
reliance on the false statement. 
10. The nature and extent ofthe damages to the plaintiff, and the 
amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the 
elements of fraud have been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then 
your verdict should be for the plaintiff on this issue. If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing propositions has 
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not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should 
be for the defendant. 
Comment: 
A definition of materiality can be found in IDJI 6.08.5. 
See Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, P.2d 303 
(2000); Watts v. Krebbs, 131 Idaho 616, 962 P.2d 387 (1998); Magic Lantern Prods. Inc. 
v. Dolsot, 126 Idaho 805, 892 P.2d 480 (1995). 
See also, Witt v. Jones, Ill Idao 477, 722 P.2d 474 (1986); Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 
Idaho 700, 682 P.2d 1247 (1983); Faw v. Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387, 613 P.2d 1338 
(1980); Smith v. King, 100 Idaho 331 597 P.2d 217 (1979); King v. McNeel, Inc., 94 
Idaho 444, 489 P.2d 1324. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --
IDJI 6.0 1.1 -Elements of contract- introductory (Modified) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
A contract is an agreement between two or more parties to do or not do 
something that is supported by consideration. 
There are four elements to complete a contract. Every contract must have 
these four elements. The four elements are: 
1. Competent parties; 
2. A lawful purpose; 
3. Valid consideration; and 
4. Mutual agreement by all parties to all essential terms. 
Comment: 
The committee recommends that this instruction be used only where the 
jury actually needs a "lecture on contracts" The detailed instruction should usually 
be unnecessary, as only specific issues in dispute need be covered. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- --
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IDJI 6.05.2 Material terms- offer and acceptance (Modified) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
A contract may consist of an offer by one party that is accepted by 
another party. 
An offer is any proposal that is intended to become binding upon the 
party making the offer if it is accepted by the party to whom it is directed. 
An acceptance of an offer is an expression by the party to whom the 
offer was directed that accepts the offer in accordance with the terms of the 
offer. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- -- --
IDJI 6.06.1 -Contract may be written or oral 
INSTRUCTIONNO. 10 
A contract may be written or oral, or may contain both written terms 
and oral terms. So long as all the required elements are pres~nt, it makes no 
difference whether the agreement is in writing. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- -- --
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IDJI 6.06.5 -Oral contracts are binding 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
An oral agreement that contains all of the elements of a contract is a 
binding contract. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other 
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IDJI 6.08.1 -Interpretation of contracts- intention of parties (Modified) 
Nate: The court must first decide whether determination of the intent of the parties is 
properly a jury issue. If it is not, obviously the instruction would not be given. Should 
the court determine that issue is properly before the jury, the following instruction may 
be appropriate: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
The terms of the contract are in dispute as to the following 
provisions: 
• Whether the defendants agreed to provide ABI with a library 
of files worth over one million dollars; 
• Whether the defendants agreed to provide ABI with 
proprietary software owned by CBI; 
• Whether the defendants agreed that payments by ABI would 
cease upon the death of Christa Beguesse. 
You must determine what was intended by the parties as evidenced by the 
contract in this case. In making this determination you should consider, 
from the evidence, the following: 
1. Any communications, conduct or dealings between the 
contracting parties showing what they intended and how they construed the 
doubtful language may be considered, provided that such may not 
completely change the agreement or construe one term inconsistently with 
the remainder of the terms. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other 26'7 
IDJI 6.08.4- Interpretation of contract - definition of material fact 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
A "material fact" is one which constitutes substantially the 
consideration of the contract, or without which it would not have been made. 
Comments: 
Black's Law Dictionary (West Pub; Fifth Ed., 1979) 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- 268 
IDJI 6.08.5- Interpretation of contract- materiality 
INSTRUCTIONNO. 14 
"Materiality" refers to the importance of the representation in 
determining the party's course of action. A representation is material if (a) a 
reasonable person would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence 
in determining a choice of action in the transaction in question, or (b) the 
maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that the recipient is 
likely to regard the matter as important in determining the choice of action, 
whether or not a reasonable person would so consider. 
Comments: 
Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616 (1998) (tort standard, referring to Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, Sections 538(2).) 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given -- Refused Modified -- Covered Other 269 
IDTI 6.09.1- Amendments to contracts 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
A contract may be amended or modified by an agreement of the 
parties. This requires all of the elements of any other contract. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- -- --
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IDJI 6.10.1- Breach ofbilateral contract....,. general case- no affirmative defenses 
INSTRUCTIONNO. 16 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following 
propositions: 
1. A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant; 
2. The defendant breached the contract; 
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of 
the propositions required of the plaintiff has been proved, then you must 
consider the issue of the affirmative defenses raised by the defendant, and 
explained in the next instruction. If you find from your consideration of all 
the evidence that any of the propositions in this instruction has not been 
proved, your verdict should be for the defendant. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other 
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IDJI 6.11- Material breach 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
A "material breach of contract," as that term is used in these 
instructions, means a breach that defeats a fundamental purpose of the 
contract. 
Comments: 
Ervin Const. v. Van Orden, 125 Id. 695, 699 (1993) 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- -- --
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IDJI 6.27 .1 - Fraud (Modified) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
To establish the defense of fraud, ABI has the burden proving by 
clear and convincing evidence each of the following propositions: 
1. The defendants made a representation of a past or present fact; 
2. The representation was false; 
3. The represented fact was important; 
4. The defendants knew the representation was false (or acted with a 
reckless disregard of the truth of the representation); 
5. ABI was not aware of the falsity ofthe representation; 
6. The defendants intended that ABI rely upon the representation in 
agreeing to enter into the contract; 
7. ABI did rely upon the representation; 
8. ABI's reliance was justified. 
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence in the case 
that each of the foregoing propositions has been proved, your verdict should 
be for ABL 
Comment: 
Materiality is defined in Instruction 6.08.5 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
An action in constructive fraud exists when there has been a breach of a duty 
arising from a relationship of trust and confidence, as in a fiduciary duty. Examples of 
relationships from which the law imposes fiduciary obligations on the parties include 
when the parties are members of the same family and business partners. ABI has alleged 
that the defendants committed constructive fraud. ABI is not required to prove that the 
defendants had (1) knowledge of falsity ofthe representations made and (2) intent to 
induce reliance, since it is inferred directly from the relationship and the breach. 
In proving a claim for constructive fraud, ABI has the burden proving by 
clear and convincing evidence each of the following propositions: 
1. The defendants made a representation of a past or present fact; 
2. The representation was false; 
3. The represented fact was important to ABI; 
4. ABI was not aware of the falsity of the representation; 
5. ABI did rely upon the representation; 
6. ABI's reliance was justified. 
7. Damages 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each of 
the foregoing propositions has been proved, your verdict should be for ABI. 
Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 846 (Idaho 2010); Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. 
Myron, 143 Idaho 595, 601, 150 P.3d 288, 294 (2006). 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --
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IDll 6.27.3- Defense of non-disclosure (Modified) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
A party is not obligated to perform a contract if that party establishes 
the defense of nondisclosure. To establish the defense of non-disclosure, 
ABI has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
1. The defendants were aware of a fact vital to the essence of 
the contract; 
2. ABI was unaware of the fact, and could not reasonably learn 
of it; 
3. The defendants knew that ABI was unaware of the true fact 
and knew that disclosure of the true fact would correct a basic assumption 
upon which ABI was making the contract; 
4. The defendants did not disclose the fact to ABI, intending 
that ABI would act in ignorance of the fact; 
5. The failure to disclose the true fact amounts to a failure to act 
in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing; 
[and] 
6. ABI entered into the contract upon the reasonable assumption 
that the non-disclosed fact did not exist. 
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence in the case 
that each of the foregoing propositions has been proved, your verdict should 
be for ABI. 
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Comment: 
There is not definitive Idaho authority on point. This instruction is felt to be 
superior to the previous IDJI 651. See, Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 161; 
obiter dicta in Janinda v. Lanning, 87 Idaho 97 (1964). 
The subject of duty to speak was tangentially addressed in Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 
91 Idaho 55, and Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, with references to 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 551. The committee feels the above instruction is 
consistent with those cases and the tort restatement, although cast in light of the 
Restatement of Contracts provisions. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --
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IDJI 9.00- Cautionary instruction on damages 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not 
express any opinion as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- --
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IDJI 9.03- Damages for breach of contract- general format (Modified) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the 
defendant, the jury m11st determine the amount of money that will reasonable 
and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any of the following elements of 
damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from the defendant's 
conduct: 
• The amounts paid by ABI to the defendants until the date of 
Christa Beguesse' s death; 
• The difference between the real value of the property 
purchased and that value which it would have had the 
representations been true. 
Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved is for you to 
determine. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- -- --
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INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
Fraud may be established by silence when a defendant had a duty to speak. 
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 24 
A duty to speak "arises in situations where the parties do not deal on equal terms 
or where information to be conveyed is not already in possession of the other party." 
G&M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991). 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --
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INSTRUCTION NO. 25 
Fraud may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. 
Idaho State Tax Comrn 'n v. Hautzinger, 137 Idaho 401, 404, 49 P.3d 206, 409 (2002). 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other 
281 
INSTRUCTION NO. 26 
A party is under a duty to disclose if a fact known by one party and not the other 
is so vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract would be voidable, and the party 
knowing the fact also knows that the other does not know it. 
Sowards v. Rathbun, 8 P.3d 1245 (Idaho 2000). 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --
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IDJI 2.30.2- Proximate cause- "substantial factor," without "but for" test. (Modified) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 27 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, in 
natural or probable sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage 
complained of. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a 
substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a 
proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred 
anyway. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --
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IDJI 9.13 -Present cash value 
INSTRUCTION NO. 28 
When I use the phrase "present cash value" as to any damage that 
may accrue in the future, I mean that sum of money determined and paid 
now which, when invested at a reasonable rate of interest, would be 
sufficient to pay the future damages at the time and in the amount the future 
damages will be incurred. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --
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IDJI 9.14 -Mitigation of damages 
INSTRUCTION NO. 29 
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to 
minimize the damage and-prevent further damage. Any loss that results 
from a failure to exercise such care cannot be recovered. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --
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INSTRUCTION NO. 30 
When considering a claim for constructive fraud, there is no need for the plaintiff 
to have proved the defendants' intent, i.e., knowledge of falsity or intent to induce 
reliance, since it is inferred directly from the relationship and the breach." 
Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. Myron, 143 Idaho 595, 601, 150 P.3d 288, 294 (2006). 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 31 
The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and 
place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would 
have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate 
damages of a different amount. 
Powers v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 139 Idaho 333, 335 (Idaho 2003) 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --
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INSTRUCTION NO. 32 
When a buyer has goods that do not conform to express or implied warranties, the 
buyer keeps the goods and sues for the difference in the value of the goods as received 
and the value of the goods as warranted plus, in a proper case, any incidental damages 
and consequential damages. 
Powers v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 139 Idaho 333, 335 (Idaho 2003) 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --
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INSTRUCTION NO. 33 
ABI asserts that the defendants warranted that CBI could transfer to ABI certain 
assets including a library of proprietary files valued at over one million dollars and a 
proprietary software program unique to CBI' s business. 
A warranty is defined as a promise that something in furtherance of the contract is 
guaranteed by one of the contracting parties. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 7th Ed. 1581 (1999) 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- --
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INSTRUCTION NO. 34 
In every contract for sale there is a warranty of title that the title of the goods is 
good and the transfer rightful. 
Idaho Code § 28-2-312. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- --
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INSTRUCTION NO. 35 
Any affirmation of fact or promise made by a seller to a buyer, which relates to 
the goods and becomes a part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that 
the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise. 
Idaho Code§ 28-2-313. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --
INSTRUCTION NO. 36 
Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis ofthe bargain 
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description. 
Idaho Code Ann. § 28-2-313. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --
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INSTRUCTION NO. 37 
There is a warranty that no other person holds a claim to or interest in the goods 
as a matter of law. 
Idaho Code Ann.§ 28-12-211 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --
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INSTRUCTION NO. 38 
Warranties may be express or implied. 
An express warranty is a warranty created by words or actions of the seller. 
Express warranties may be created by affirmations of fact or promises made by the seller 
to the buyer relating to the goods that becomes the basis of the bargain; (2) a description 
of the goods that becomes part of the basis ofthe bargain; or (3) a sample or model made 
part of the basis of the bargain. 
An implied warranty arises because of the circumstances ofthe sale rather than a 
seller's express promise. 
Idaho Code§ 28-2-313; Black's Law Dictionary 7th Ed. 1582 (1999) 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 39 
If you fmd by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants expressly 
warranted that they were transferring a library of proprietary files valued over one million 
dollars and/or a proprietary software program unique to CBI's business to ABI, then your 
verdict should be for ABI. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered -- Other 295 
INSTRUCTION NO. 40 
If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants did not have 
title to a library of proprietary files valued over one million dollars and/or a proprietary 
software program unique to CBI' s business, then your verdict should be for ABL 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --
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INSTRUCTION NO. 41 
ABI asserts that the defendants impliedly warranted that the assets to be 
transferred would be merchantable. This implied warranty means that the property is fit 
for the ordinary purpose for which it is used and that it would conform to the promises or 
affirmations of fact made by the defendants. 
If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants impliedly 
warranted that the library of files and the proprietary software were warranted for a as 
merchantable, then your verdict should be for ABI. 
Black's Law Dictionary 7th Ed. 1582 (1999) 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --
297 
INSTRUCTION NO. 42 
ABI asserts that the defendants impliedly warranted that the assets were fit for a 
particular purpose. An implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose means that if a 
. seller has reason to know of the buyer's special purpose for the property, that the property 
is suitable for those purposes. 
If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants impliedly 
warranted that the library of files and the proprietary software were warranted for a 
particular purpose, then your verdict should be for ABI. 
Idaho Code§ 28-2-315; Black's Law Dictionary 7th Ed. 1582 (1999). 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered· Other --
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INSTRUCTION NO. 43 
The term "consequential damages" is defined as losses that do not flow directly 
and immediately from an injurious act, but that result indirectly from the act. 
Black's Law Dictionary 7th Ed. 394 (1999). 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- --
299 
INSTRUCTION NO. 44 
The term "incidental damages" is defined as "losses reasonably associated with or 
related to actual damages." 
Black's Law Dictionary 7th Ed. 395 (1999). 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --
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INSTRUCTION NO. 45 
In order to prevail in a misappropriation action under the Idaho Trade Secrets Act, 
the defendants must show that a trade secret actually existed. Without a proven trade 
secret there can be no misappropriation even if ABI' s action was wrongful. 
Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho 726, 734, 992 P.2d 175, 183 (1999). 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- -- --
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INSTRUCTION NO. 46 
Information is only a trade secret if it derives independent economic value, actual 
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure and 
use; and is the subject of effects that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain 
its secrecy. 
Idaho Code Ann.§ 48-801(5)(a)-(b). 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- --
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INSTRUCTION NO. 47 
One factor that may be considered when deciding if information constitutes a 
trade secret is "the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly 
acquired or duplicated by others." 
RESTATEMENT (TORTS)§ 757 cmt b (1939); Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho 
726, 735, 992 P.2d 175, 184 (1999). 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- --
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INSTRUCTION NO. 48 
"Misappropriation" means: 
(a) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to 
know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or (b) Disclosure or use of a 
trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who: 
(A) Used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or 
(B) At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his knowledge 
of the trade secret was: 
(i) Derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire 
it; 
(ii) Acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or 
limit its use; or 
(iii) Derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking 
relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or 
(C) Before a material change of his position, knew or had reason to know that it was 
a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake. 
Idaho Code § 48-801 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given -- Refused Modified Covered Other 304 
INSTRUCTION NO. 49 
In this case, the defendants have asserted that ABI misappropriated its trade 
secrets by improper means and that such misappropriation has damaged the defendants. 
In order to enter a verdict for the defendants, the defendants must demonstrate by clear 
and convincing evidence that ABI misappropriated trade secrets by improper means. If 
the defendants do not meet their burden, then your verdict must be for ABI. 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- 305 
INSTRUCTION NO. 50 
The term "improper means" includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or 
inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or 
other means. 
Idaho Code Ann. § 48-801(1). 
Plaintiffs Requested Instruction 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other -- --
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W. Marcus W. Nye (ISB#: 1629) 
David E. Alexander (ISB#: 4489) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, 
BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208)232-61 01 
Fax: (208)232-6109 
BONNE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
April Beguesse, Inc. An Idaho Corporation, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
Case No. CV-09-2767 
) 
vs. ) 
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED SPECIAL 
VERDICT FORM 
) 
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa , ) 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation. ) 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rarnmell, by its ) 




We, the Jury, answer the special inteiTogatories as follows: 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS 
Fraud 
Question No.1: Did the Defendants commit fraud? 
Answer to Question No.1: Yes[__] No[__] 
Constructive Fraud 
Question No.2: Did the Defendants commit constructive fraud? 
Answer to Question ;No.2: Yes [__] No[__] 
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT FORM- 1 
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Breach of Contract and Warranty, Library of Proprietary Files 
Question No.3: Did the plaintiffk:now or should it reasonably have k:nown, on or before 
May 7, 2005, that it could not sell the library of files without its customer's permission? 
Answer to Question No.3: Yes L_] NoL_] 
Ifyou answered Question No.3 "Yes," please skip Questions 4 and 5 and continue on to Question 
6. Ifyou answered Question No.3 "No," continue and answer Questions 4 and 5. 
Question No. 4: Did the defendants breach a contract with plaintiff ABI relating to the 
library of proprietary files? 
Answer to Question No.4: Yes L_] NoL_] 
Question No. 5: Did the defendants breach a wananty with plaintiff ABI relating to the 
library of proprietary files? 
Answer to Question No. 5: Yes [_] NoL_] 
Breach of Contract and Warranty, Proprietary Software 
Question No.6: Did the Plaintiff ABI prove each of the following facts with respect to the 
claims of breach of contract and breach ofwananty relating to the proprietary software? 
(1) That defendants made a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual 
or constructive k:nowledge of the truth; 
(2) that the plaintiff did not k:now or could not discover the truth; 
(3) that the false representation or concealment was made with the intent that it be relied on; 
and 
( 4) that the plaintiff relied and acted upon the representation or concealment to his prejudice, 
with the result that the plaintiff was unable to determine that the software was not proprietary before 
May 7, 2005. 
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT FORM- 2 
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Answer to Question No.6: Yes L_j No[_J 
If you answered Question No. 6 "Yes," please continue and answer Questions 7 and 8. If you 
answered Question No.6 "No," skip Questions 7 and 8 and continue to the next section. 
Question No. 7: Did the defendants breach a contract with plaintiff ABI relating to the 
proprietary software? 
Answer to Question No. 7: Yes [_] No 
Question No. 8: Did the defendants breach a warranty with plaintiff ABI relating to the 
proprietary software? 
Answer to Question No.8: Yes L_j No[_J 
PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES 
If you answered "Yes" to either Question 1, Question 2, Question 4, Question 5, Question 7 or 
Question 8, please answer Question 9. If you answered "No" to all of these questions, continue on 
to Question 1 0. 
Question No.9: What is the total amount of damages to plaintiff ABI proximately caused 
by the fraud, constructive fi'aud or breach of contract or warranty by the Defendants? 
Answer: 
DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIMS 
Breach of Contract 
Question No. 10: Did ABI breach a contract with any of the defendants? 
Answer to Question No. 10: Yes [_J No[_J 
Unjust Enrichment/Implied Contract 
Question No. 11: Should the defendants recover from the plaintiff ABI on their claim 
of unjust enrichment or implied contract? 
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Answer to Question No. 11: Yes Nol_j 
Misappropriation of Trade Secrets 
Question No. 12: Did the plaintiff ABI misappropriate trade secrets belonging to one or 
more of the defendants? 
Answer to Question No. 12: Yes Nol_j 
If you answered "Yes" to Question 1 0, Question 11 or Question 12, please answer Question 13. If 
you answered "No" to all of them, please date and sign the verdict fonn in the spaces provided. 
DEFENDANTS' DAMAGES 
Question No. 13: What is the total amount of damages to the Defendants proximately caused 
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David E. Alexander (ISB#: 4489) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, 
BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208)232-6101 
Fax: (208)232-61 09 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 






Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa , ) 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation. ) 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its ) 




Case No. CV-09-2767 
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL 
VERDICT FORM 
COME NOW, THE Defendants, by and through counsel, and respectfully submit the 
following proposed substitute Jury Instructions Nos. la, 15a, 25a, and 32a, and Special Verdict 
Form, to be substituted for those previously submitted. This Defendant reserves the right to submit 
additional instructions at trial based upon issues that may arise during the course of the trial or after 
review of Plaintiffs proposed jury instructions. 
DATED this ~day of September, 2011. 
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY mSTRUCTIONS - 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ day of September, 2011, I served a true, correct and 
copy ofthe above and foregoing document upon the following person(s) as follows: 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. Avondet 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
21 05 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 2 
- t(l}.s. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[] Facsimile (208) 529-9732 
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INSTRUCTION NO. k 
The following facts are not in dispute: 
Plaintiff April Beguesse, Inc., (ABI) is an Idaho corporation fully owned by April 
Beguesse. Defendant Christa Beguesse, Inc., (CBI) is an Idaho corporation whose shares are 
owned by Defendants Kenneth J. Rammell and the Estate of Christa Beguesse-Rammell. 
Christa Rammell and Kenneth Rammell were married in Califomia in 1988, and they 
remained married until her death in November 2008. Christa was the mother from a previous 
marriage of April Beguesse. Kenneth Rammell was Christa's sole heir under a Last Will and 
Testament she wrote in September 2007. 
Until January 2004, CBI operated a typesetting business located in Idaho Falls. Christa 
Beguesse started a typesetting business in California in the 1970s. In the early 1980s, she began 
typesetting law books for a California publisher called The Rutter Group. By the mid-1990s, The 
Rutter Group represented most of Christa's business. In 1996, she dissolved her Califomia 
corporation, moved to Idaho Falls with Kem1eth Rammell, and formed the Idaho corporation, 
Christa Beguesse, Inc., which is a party to this case. Kenneth and Christa were equal shareholders 
in the new corporation. 
After the move to Idaho, CBI retained only one customer, The Rutter Group. CBI had no 
contract or binding agreement requiring The Rutter Group to use CBI' s typesetting services. CBI 
continued to operate the typesetting business until it sold the business to April Beguesse, Inc. in 
January 2004. 
In November 2001, Ken and Christa Ran1mell proposed to April Beguesse that she move 
to Idaho Falls and go to work for CBI in order to learn the business so she could take it over. 
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April did so and began working for CBI in January 2002. Cln·ista taught April the operation of 
the business and made sure that the customer approved of the planned change in ownership. 
April Beguesse was aware that The Rutter Group was not obligated by contract to use her 
services, and could take its typesetting business to another provider at any time. By this time, The 
Rutter Group was owned by West Publishing, a division of Thomson Reuters Corporation, one of 
the largest publishing companies in the world. 
In Janumy 2004, the business began operating in the same location and with the same 
equipment, assets and employees under the ownership of ABL Under the agreement entered into 
between ABI and CBI, ABI was to pay to CBI the sum of$12,000.00 per month for eight years, 
and Cln·ista Beguesse was to be available to ABI for consulting as needed. 
ABI made those payments for four years and 10 months until Christa's death in November 
2008. From January 2004 through December 2010, ABI had revenues from its one customer, The 
Rutter Group, of$2,765,337.00. During that same time, out ofthose revenues, ABI made 
payments to CBI pursum1t to the agreement in the amount of $684,520.00. Also during that time, 
ABI paid salary, benefits and profits to April Beguesse in the amount of at least $753,000.00. 
ABI is still operating the typesetting business and doing work for The Rutter Group. It has 
lost none of the work it was doing for The Rutter Group before Christa's death, and has obtained 
new business since Christa's death. ABI has incurred no monetary damages as a result ofthe 
fraud, breach of contract and breach of warranty alleged in this case. 
IDJI 1.07- Facts not in dispute 
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GIVEN: --
REFUSED : __ _ 
MODIFIED: __ _ 
COVERED: ---
OTHER: ___ _ 
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INSTRUCTION No./) {i{_; 
The terms of the contract are in dispute as to the following provisions: 
Whether the parties agreed that the assets of the business to be transferred from Christa 
Beguesse, Inc. to April Beguesse, Inc., included (1) a library of files which ABI could later sell, and 
(2) a proprietary computer program, written by Christa Beguesse, that made incoming files flow 
easier and was specifically designed for the structure of the outline of the customer's books. 
(30(b)(6) depo, p. 83) 
You must determine what was intended by the paiiies as evidenced by the contract in this 
case. In making this determination you should consider, from the evidence, the following: 
1. The contract must be construed as a whole, including all of the circumstances 
giving rise to it, to give consistent mea11ing to every part of it. 
2. Language must be given its ordinmy meaning, unless you find from the evidence 
that a special meaning was intended. 
3. Any communications, conduct or dealings between the contracting parties 
showing what they intended and how they construed the doubtful language may be considered, 
provided that such may not completely change the agreement or construe one term inconsistently 
with the remainder of the terms. 
4. The contract should be construed to avoid any contradiction or absurdities. 
Persons within a specialized field are deemed to have contracted with reference to any 
generally known and customarily accepted language in that field, unless you find from the 
evidence that this was not intended. 
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In this case the defendant has asserted certain affirmative defenses to the claim offraud. The 
defendant has the burden of proof on each of the affirmative defenses asserted. 
The Defendant has asserted that the claim of fraud is barred by the statute oflimitations. The 
statute of limitations for fraud begins to run when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have 
known ofthe facts constituting the fraud. You can infer that the plaintiffhad actual knowledge of 
the facts constituting the fraud at the time that the plaintiff could have discovered the fraud by the 
exercise of due diligence. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the plaintiff knew or reasonably 
should have known of the facts constituting the fraud on or before May 7, 2006, then your verdict 
should be for the defense. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these 
propositions have not been proved, then the defendant has not proved the affirmative defense in this 
case. 
IDJI 6.1 0.4 - General contract- affirmative defenses 








INSTRUCTION NO. 3;(q 
In this case the defendant has asserted certain affirmative defenses to the claims of fraud, 
breach of contract and breach of warranty. The defendant has the burden of proof on each of the 
affirmative defenses asserted. 
The Defendant has asserted that the claims are barred by the doctrine of laches. "Laches" 
means the neglect to assert a right or a claim which, taken together with lapse of time and other 
circumstances, causes prejudice to the other party, such that it would be unfair to pe1mit the plaintiff 
to bring the claim at this time. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the doctrine of laches should 
apply, then your verdict should be for the defense. If you find from your consideration of all the 
evidence that laches not been proved, then the defendant has not proved the affirmative defense in 
this case. 
IDJI 6.10.4- General contract affirmative defenses 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 787 (5th ed. 1979) 








IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAl_]DI~lfRJch A 8 :26 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual, 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, THE ESTATE OF CHIRIST A 
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by it qualified 
personal representative, Kenneth Rammell, 
Defendants/Counterclaimant. 
Case No. CV-09-2767 
ORDER ON MOTION IN LIMINE, 
VACATING TRIAL 
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to preclude 
the proffered testimony of Defendant's expert witness Bruce Denney. Plaintiff argues 
that Denney was not timely identified by Defendant nor was his anticipated testimony 
timely disclosed. Plaintiff correctly argues that the disclosure of Denney was not within 
the time lines set by the Court. However, Plaintiff also bears some responsibility for the 
late disclosure and need for this additional testimony. There is little dispute that 
Plaintiff's current valuation of alleged damages is significantly different than the 
originally disclosed valuation of damages. While Defendant likely should have been 
more expeditious in preparing Denney as a witness and disclosing his testimony, the need 
for Denney only arose as a result of Plaintiff deciding at a relatively late date to change 
the method and manner by which alleged damages were going to be argued to the jury. 
ORDER ON MOTION IN LIMINE - 1 322 A 
Additionally, a trial court should not impose a sanction that would prevent an 
adjudication of the case on the merits without considering lesser sanctions or alternatives. 
Roe v. Doe, 129 Idaho 663, 668, 931 P .2d 657, 662 (App., 1996). Plaintiff has made a 
conditional motion for continuance of the trial in the event Denney was allowed to 
testifY. Plaintiff has argued that if Denney is not precluded from testifying, Plaintiff needs 
to depose Denney and possibly retain a rebuttal expert. Such a request is reasonable 
under the circumstances. 
Accordingly, the Court determines that in the interests of a full and complete 
disclosure of witnesses, and a trial on the merits, Plaintiffs motion in limine is denied. 
Plaintiffs motion to continue the trial is granted. Discovery will be reopened but limited 
to discovery of Denney's opinions and the preparation and identification of any rebuttal 
expert, and the timely disclosure of such rebuttal expert's opinions by deposition or 
otherwise. 1 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
·cr Dated this _(_ day of September, 2011. 
1 This ruling does not affect the Court's previous ruling as to the deposition of Kent Oseen. 
ORDER ON MOTION IN LIMINE- 2 322 B 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this j!fday of September, 2011, I did send a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the 
correct postage thereon, or by placement in the courthouse mailbox. 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
BEARD ST.CLAIRGAFFNEY FAX l)r.Zf .. 173.:(_ 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
David E. Alexander 
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE FAX J..3J- b J D1 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
ORDER ON MOTION IN LIMINE - 3 
Clerk of the District Court 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 
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KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, ESTATE of 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by 




ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 
STATUS CONFERENCE 
Case No. CV-09-2767 
Pursuant to Rule 16, I.R.C.P., it is hereby ordered that a 
status conference be conducted by and between the Court and the 
counsel of record in regard to the above-entitled case on October 
7, 2011, at 8:45a.m. 
It is further ordered that at least one of the attorneys for 
each party participating in said status conference have authority 
to enter into stipulations and to make admissions regarding all 
matters that the parties may reasonably anticipate 
discussed. (See Rule 16 (b) and Rule 16 (c)). Counsel shall a so 
be prepared to furnish the Court with available dates for a pre-
trial conference and trial setting. 
The Plaintiff is directed to initiate the telephone 
conference call to the Court. The telephone number is 52 9-1350 · 
extension 1340. 
Dated this ;l_O day of September, 2011 
/S/HON. JOEL E. TINGEY 
JOEL E. TINGEY 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
322 D 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certi t t on the ~0 of Sept 
mailed or hand delivered a true and correct copy of 
document to the following: 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. Avondet 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-75495 
W. Marcus W. Nye 
David E. Alexander 
PO Box 1391 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF.BONNEVI 





"~ENDED ORDER AND NOTICE 
RESCHEDULING JURY TRIAL 
Case No. CV-09-2767 
KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, ESTATE of 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by 
Its quali ed personal 
Representative, Kenneth 
Rarrune 11 , 
Defendants. 
Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho Rules of vil Procedure, 
the following pre-trial schedule shall govern all proceedings 
this case: 
ORDER 
I. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. A Pre-trial Conference is scheduled for March 20, 2012 
at 8:45 a.m. 
2. Jury trial is scheduled for 10:00 a.m. on April 10, 
2012. Trial may go 4-5 days which may continue into a 
second week. In that case the second week of trial 
will continue on Tuesday, April 17, 2012. 
3. All deadlines remain in effect as outlined in the prior 
Order. 
DATED this~ day of October, 2011. 
322 F 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certi that on the + day of October, 201 , I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to 
be delivered to the following: 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. Avondet 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-75495 
W. Marcus W. Nye 
David E. Alexander 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
ORDER 
RONALD LONGMORE 
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KENNETH ~~ELL, an individual 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, ESTATE of 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by 





Case No. CV-09 2767 
On the 6th day of December, 2011, Plaintiff's motion for 
reconsideration came before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, 
District Judge, in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick 1 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Jeff Brunson appeared for and on behalf of the 
Plaintiff. 
Mr. David Alexander and Mr. Aaron Crary appeared on behalf 
of the Defendants. 
Mr. Brunson presented Plaintiff's motion for 
reconsideration. Mr. Alexander presented argument in opposition 
to the motion. Mr. Brunson presented rebuttal argument. 
The Court granted the motion for reconsideration. Mr. 
Brunson will prepare a propos Order for the Court 1 S si 
322 H 
.. / 
Court was thus adjourned. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~~ day of January, 2011, I 
caused a true and correct cop~ the foregoing document to 
be delivered to the following: 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. Avondet 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-75495 
W. Marcus W. Nye 
David E. Alexander 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, ESTATE of 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by 
















Case No. CV-09-2767 
On the 20th day of March, 2012, a Pretrial Conference came 
before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, in open 
court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Je Brunson appeared for and on behalf of the 
Plaintiff. 
Mr. David Alexander appeared on behalf of the Defendants. 
Defendant Kenneth Rammell was present at counsel table. 
Trial is scheduled for April 10, 2012. There is a motion in 
limine scheduled for April 6th. No unusual questions of law are 
expected. Trial is scheduled to last 4-5 days. Counsel will 
advise Court regarding witnesses to be called and exhibits to 
be used at least one week prior to trial. The Court will summon 
322 J 
50 prospective jurors. Each s will have 4 peremptory 
llenges. Jury ions are due one week to trial. 
Counsel should be prepared to advise the other party 
witnesses will be called for the next day. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2D day of March, 2012, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to 
be delivered to the following: 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. Avondet 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-75495 
W. Marcus W. Nye 
David E. Alexander 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
RONALD LONGMORE 
322 K 
REQUEST FOR JURY 
(CIVIL) 
Title of Case: 
Date and Time Trial to Begin: 
Number of Jurors to be Summoned: 50 
Magistrate or District? 
Courtroom: To Be 
Time for Jurors to Report for Orientation: 




W. Marcus W. Nye 
David E. Alexander 
PO Box 1391 






Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEYPA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Tel: (208) 523-5171 
Fax: (208) 529-9732 
Email: jeff@beardstclair.com 
javondet@beardstclair.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
r~ 38:02 p.m. 04-03-2012 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Case No.: CV-09-2767 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
VS. 
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rarnmell, by its 
qualified personal representative, Kenneth 
Ramrnell, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL 
VERDICT FORM 
The plaintiff, April Beguesse, Inc. (ABI), through counsel of record, Beard St. 
Clair Gaffney PA, respectfully objects to Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions and 
Special Verdict Form dated September 9, 2011. ABI objects to the entire set of jury 
instructions and special verdict form and more specifically objects as follows. 
• Special Verdict Form- the proposed special verdict form is incomplete and does 
not cover all of the Plaintiff's claims. The proposed special verdict form is vague 









f'?·38:13 p.m. 04-03-2012 
and confusing as to Plaintiff's claims and over-simplifies the Defendant's claims. 
• No. la (substitute for 1)- contains facts which are in dispute and is overbroad and 
unnecessary. 
• No. 3 -should not be given because the Court has already determined that the 
contract in question is ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence is appropriate. This 
instruction would confuse the jury. 
• No.5- does not accurately state elements of constructive fraud. The instruction 
as stated is confusing and unclear. Reference to jury verdict form is confusing. 
• No. 6 -instruction has potential to cause confusion to the jury by referencing jury 
verdict form. 
• No. 9- is cumulative and has potential to cause confusion to the jury. 
• No. 10- instruction has potential to cause confusion to the jury by referencing 
jury verdict form. 
• No. 11 -this instruction combines unjust enrichment and implied contract. This 
instruction misstates elements of unjust enrichment and implied contract and is 
confusing. 
• No. 12 -this instruction is confusing and does not accurately state elements of 
misappropriation of trade secrets. 
• No. 13- this instruction is cumulative and confusing. 
• No. 14 - this instruction is confusing, does not correctly state the elements of 
breach of warranty, and inclusion of the term "so-called" suggests that it is not a 
viable claim. 
• No. 15a (replacing 15)- this instruction does not include all of the disputed terms 
Plaintiff's Objection to Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions and Special Verdict Form 
Page 2 
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nor does it correctly state the terms which are disputed. 
• No. 16- this instruction does not correctly state the law or how the contract 
should be interpreted based on the Court's previous ruling regarding the contract. 
• No. 17- this instruction is confusing and unnecessary . 
• No. 20 -this instruction is unnecessary and confusing. What the terms of the 
contract are in dispute and tllis instruction makes it seem one-sided. 
• No. 21- this instruction is unnecessary and confusing. What the terms of the 
contract are in dispute and this instruction makes it seem one-sided. 
• No. 23- this instruction is unnecessary and confusing. This instruction is not 
proper in light oftl1e Court's previous ruling regarding ilie contract. 
• No. 25a (replacing 25)- iliis instruction does not correctly state the elements of 
statute of limitations, is overbroad, and is confusing. 
• No. 27- this instruction is overbroad, confusing, and unnecessary. This 
instruction suggests that a written contract is necessary by stating "the precise 
language of the contract". 
No. 28- this instruction is unnecessary. 
No. 29- iliis instruction is cumulative and unnecessary. 
• No. 30- this instruction does not correctly state the requirements for ilie statute of 
limitations defense. Tills instruction incorrectly computes the time deadline. Tills 
instruction is confusing and is unclear as to willch claim or claims it applies to. 
This instruction is cumulative. 
• No. 31 -this instruction is confusing, does not adequately state the law, and does 
not correctly refer to the Court's ruling. 
Plaintiff's Objection to Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions and Special Verdict Form 
Page 3 





""·38:35 p.m. 04-03-2012 
• No. 32a (replacing 32)- this instruction misstates the law of laches and confuses 
laches with the statute of limitations. This instruction is confusing and 
cumulative. 
• No. 34- this instruction is cumulative and there should be one instruction that 
applies to both parties. This instruction includes improper elements of damage 
and is confusing. 
• No. 35- this instruction includes improper elements of damage and is confusing. 
• No. 38 -this instruction is unnecessary and confusing. This instruction does not 
accurately state the Court's decision or the law. 
• No. 39- this instruction is confusing and cumulative. 
• No. 40- this instruction is overbroad and confusing. It is unclear whose defense 
or claim it is referring to. 
DATED: April 3, 2012. 
Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions and Special Verdict Form 
Page 4 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I am an attorney licensed in the State ofidaho, have my office 
located in Idaho Falls, Idaho and on April 3, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
AND SPECIAL VERDICT FORM up
0
on the followingDa .. s. indicated below: / 
David E. Alexander · § ~ 
····.·· U.S. Mail Hand-Delivered ·· Facsimile Racine Olson Nye Budge Bailey 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-13 9 
Fax: 232-6109 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N Capital A venue 




air Gaffney P A 
e Plaintiff 
CJ U.S. Mail q Hand-Delivered 
/ 
Ej F . '1 ··· · acsuru e 
Plaintiff's Objection to Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions and Special Verdict Form 
Page 5 
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KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, ESTATE of 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by 





Case No. CV-09-2767 
On the 6th day of April, 2012, Plaintiff's motion in limine 
re: Denney and renewed motion in limine re: April Beguesse tax 
information, and Defendants' motion to withdraw deemed admission 
admitted came before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District 
Judge, in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Jeff Brunson appeared for and on behalf of the 
Plainti 
Mr. David Alexander appeared on behalf of the Defendants. 
Defendant Kenneth Rammell was present at counsel table. 
Mr. Brunson presented Plaintiff's motion in limine re: Bruce 
Denney and renewed motion in limine re: April Beguesse tax 
information. Mr. Alexander presented argument in opposition to 
327 A 
Plaintiff's motions in limine and presented Defendants' motion to 
thdraw deemed admissions admitted. f.-1r. Brunson presented 
opposition to Defendants' motion to withdraw and presented 
rebuttal argument. Mr. Alexander presented rebuttal argument. 
Mr. Brunson advised that there may be a potential problem 
regarding a witness, Janell Racine, who has had recent surgery 
and may not be available to testify. Mr. Alexander stated that 
he does not believe she has any pertinent information to the 
trial. 
The Court denied the motion in limine re: Denney. The Court 
granted the motion in limine re: April Beguesse tax returns. The 
Court denied the motion to withdraw admissions as to 11, 12 and 
13; granted as to 18 and 19. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
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Case No. CV-09-2767 
On the 9th day of April, 2012, Janelle Racine's motion to 
quash subpoena came before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, strict 
Judge, by telephonic connection open court at Idaho Falls, 
Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk 1 were present. 
Mr. Jeff Brunson appeared for and on behalf of the 
Plaintiff. 
Mr. David Alexander appeared on behalf of the Defendants. 
Defendant Kenneth Rammell was present at counsel table. 
Mr. Gary Cooper appeared as counsel of record for Janelle 
Rae 
Mr. Cooper presented Ms. Racine's motion to quash subpoena. 
Mr. Brunson presented argument in opposition to the motion to 
327 D 
Mr. Alexander joined in support of the motion to quash. 
Mr. Cooper presented rebuttal argument in support of motion 
to quash. 
The Court denied the motion to quash. Court granted a 
protective order and will require a deposition place of trial 
testimony. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
~~~~~ J E. TINGY 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual, ) 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, ESTATE OF CHRISTA ) 
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by its qualified ) 
personal representative, Kenneth ) 
Rammel!. ) 
) 
Defendants. ) __________________________ ) 
Case No. CV-09-2767 
ANSWER TO SECOND 
AMENDED COI\-IPLAINT 
COME NOW the Defendants, KENNETH RAMMELL individually and as personal 
representative of the EST ATE OF CHRIST A BEGUESSE RAMMELL, and CHRIST A 
BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho corporation, by and through their attorney ofrecord, Marcus W. Nye 
of the firm of Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chartered, and in response to the Second 
Amended Complaint and Jury Demand ("Second Amended Complaint") of the Plaintiff filed herein, 
admit, deny and allege as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
ANSWER TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND JURV DEMAND- 1 
f'\ t'\ ·'\ 
.J L •:J 
The Second Amended Complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted against these Defendants, and should be dismissed. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
1. Defendants deny each and every allegation of the Second Amended Complaint not 
specifically admitted herein. 
2. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 1 though 8 of the Second Amended 
Complaint. 
3. In response to paragraph 9 of the Second Amended Complaint Defendants deny that 
"April believed that Christa was the sole owner of CBI" and admits that Christa had been running 
her business for years before she married Rammel!. 
4. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph! 0 of the Second Amended Complaint. 
5. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 11 through 15 of the Second Amended 
Complaint. 
6. In response to paragraph 16 of the Complaint, Defendants state that a contract was 
entered into between Christa Beguesse, Inc. and April Beguesse, Inc., the terms of which contract 
speak for themselves. 
7. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of the Complaint. 
8. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 20 of the Complaint. 
9. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Complaint. 
10. Defendants are without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the 
allegations of paragraph 23 of the Complaint, and therefore deny the same. 
11. Defendants deny the allegations ofParagraph 24 of the Second Amended Complaint. 
ANSWER TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND- 2 
32~1 
12. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 25 of the Complaint, and state further 
that the contract speaks for itself. 
13. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 26, 27 and 28 of the Complaint. 
14. In response to paragraph 29, Defendants deny that April signed the contract "based 
on the representations of Rammell and Christa." Defendants admit that April signed a contract 
entitled "Lease Agreement" between CBI and ABI, effective January 1, 2004. 
15. In response to paragraphs 3 0 and 31 of the Complaint, Defendant states that the 
alleged contract speaks for itself. 
16. The Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 32 tlu·ough 37, and specifically 
avert that a holographic Will was found. 
17. Defendants deny the allegation of paragraph 3 8. 
18. In response to paragraph 39 of the Second Amended Complaint, to the extent that it 
alleges the existence of a contract between CBI and a customer, said contract speaks for itself. 
19. In response to paragraph 40 of the Second Amended Complaint, Defendants deny 
ever having made reference to a "library" owned by CBI, or any representations contrary to the facts. 
To the extent that this paragraph 40 may make allegations regarding the typesetting working files 
for the customer's products, the Defendants deny the allegation that these files are owned by the 
customer. 
20. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 41 of the Second Amended Complaint. 
21. Defendants admit the allegations ofparagraphs42 through45 of the Second Amended 
Complaint. 
COUNT 1: DECLARATORY RELIEF 
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22. In response to paragraph 46 of the Second Amended Complaint, the Defendants 
restate their responses to paragraphs 1 through 45. 
23. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 4 7 through 51. 
24. Defendants admitthe allegations of paragraph 52 ofthe Complaint. 
25. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 53 to 56 of the Complaint. 
COUNT 2: FRAUD 
26. In response to paragraph 57 of the Complaint, Defendants restate their responses to 
paragraphs 1 through 56. 
27. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 58 through 69. 
COUNT 3: CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 
28. In response to paragraph 70 of the Second Amended Complaint, Defendants restate 
their responses to paragraphs 1 through 69. 
29. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 71 through 76 of the Complaint. 
COUNT 4: BREACH OF CONTRACT 
30. In response to paragraph 77 of the Second Amended Complaint, Defendants restate 
their responses to paragraphs 1-7 6. 
31. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 78 and 79. 
32. In response to paragraph 80 of the Second Amended Complaint, Defendant admits 
that the parties entered into a binding contract, pursuant to which the parties performed from January 
2004 until November 2008, and that the terms of the contract speak for themselves. 
33. In response to paragraph 81 ofthe Second Amended Complaint. Defendant admits 
that ABI substantially performed its obligations under the contract until November 2008, at which 
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time it ceased performing under the contract, and is currently in material breach thereof. 
34. Defendants deny the allegations of82 through 87 of the Second Amended Complaint. 
COUNT 5: BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY 
35. In response to paragraph 88 of the Complaint, Defendants restate their responses 1 
through 87. 
36. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 89 of the Second Amended Complaint. 
3 7. In response to paragraph 90, Defendants allege that Plaintiff is now in material breach 
of its obligations under the contract. 
38. Defendants deny the allegations ofparagraphs 91 and 92. 
39. In response to paragraphs 93 through 96 of the Second Amended Complaint, the 
Idaho Statutes referenced therein speak for themselves and are the best evidence of the statutory 
requirements. Said paragraphs do not otherwise appear to require a response from the Defendants. 
40. Defendant deny the allegations of paragraphs 97 through 100. 
COUNT 6: BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY 
41. In response to paragraph 1 0 1 of the Second Amended Complaint, Defendants restate 
their responses to paragraphs 1 through I 00. 
42. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 102. 
43. In response to paragraph 103, Defendants admit that ABI substantially performed its 
obligations under the contract through November 2008, but since that time is in material breach of 
the contract. 
44. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs I 04 through 11I. 
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COUNT 7: UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
45. In response to paragraph 112 of the Second Amended Complaint, Defendants restate 
their responses to paragraphs 1 through 111. 
46. In response to paragraph 113, Defendants admit that ABI paid Defendants $12,000.00 
per month for February 2004 to November 2008. Defendants deny all other allegations of paragraph 
113. 
4 7. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 114 through 116 of the Complaint. 
COUNT 8: QUASI-ESTOPPEL 
48. In response to paragraph 117 of the Second Amended Complaint, Defendant restates 
its responses to paragraphs 1 through 116. 
49. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 118 through 121 of the Second 
Amended Complaint. 
50. Defendants admit the allegation of paragraphs 122 through 123 of the Second 
Amended Complaint. 
51. In response to Paragraph 124 of the Second Amended Complaint, Defendants aver 
that a holographic will was produced. 
52. Defendant deny the allegations of paragraphs 125 through 128 of the Second 
Amended Complaint. 
COUNT 9: PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
53. In response to paragraph 129 of the Second Amended Complaint, Defendant restates 
its responses to paragraphs 1 through 128. 
54. Defendant deny the allegations of paragraphs 130 through 133 of the Second 
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Amended Complaint. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The claims of the Plaintiff are baned by the applicable statutes of frauds, including but not 
limited to Idaho Code§ 9-505, § 15-2-701, and§ 28-2-201. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The claims of the Plaintiff are barred by the applicable of statutes oflimitations, including 
but not limited to I.C. § 5-216, § 5-217, § 5-218, and§§ 15-3-801, et seq. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claims for declaratory judgement, fraud, constructive fraud, breach of contract, 
breach of express and implied warranties and unjust enrichment and quasi-estoppel are barred by the 
doctrine of laches. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of waiver. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff should be estopped from denying its obligations and duties under the contract. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants expressly disclaimed in the contract all express and implied warranties. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claims should be barred by Plaintiff's material breach of the contract at issue in 
this matter. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendants have been required to retain the services of the law finn of Racine, Olson, Nye, 
~ I') '1. 
\. .. •' 
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Budge & Bailey, Chtd., and are entitled to a reasonable fee therefor pursuant to Idaho Code, 
including, but not limited to, I.C. §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121 and paragraph 17 of the Lease Agreement 
between the parties. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that judgment be entered in this action declaring the 
respective rights and duties of the parties, dismissing the Plaintiffs complaint with prejudice, 
awarding the Defendants their reasonable attorney's fees and costs, and granting Defendants such 
other and further relief as is just under the circumstances. 
JURY DEMAND 
Defendant Ke1meth Rammel, individually and as personal representative of the estate of 
Christa Beguesse Rammel, and Defendant CBI hereby request a trial by jury on all issues so triable. 
Dated this .tf:!iy of April, 2012 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & 
BAILEY, CHARTERED 
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CERTIFICATE OF~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the0ctay ofM~2010, I served a true, correct and 
copy of the above and foregoing document upon the following person(s) as follows: 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. Avondet 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
[] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
[] Facsimile (208) 529-9732 
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W. Marcus W. Nye (ISB#: 1629) 
David E. Alexander (ISB#: 4489) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, 
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P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208)232-61 01 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, ) Case No. CV-09-2767 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) MOTION FOR DIRECTIVE VERDICT 
vs. ) 
) 
KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual, ) 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, EST ATE OF CHRIST A ) 
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by its qualified ) 
personal representative, Kenneth ) 
Rammel!. ) 
) 
Defendants. ) ___________________________ ) 
COME NOW the Defendants, KENNETH RAMMELL individually, ("Mr. Rammell") and 
as personal representative of the ESTATE OF CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, ("the Estate") 
and CHRIST A BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho corporation, ("CBI") by and through their attorney of 
record, David E. Alexander, pursuant to Rule 50( a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
hereby submit their Motion for Directive Verdict and move this Court for an order granting said 
motion against Plaintiff, APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., ("ABI") based on the following grounds: 
MOTION FOR DIRECTIVE VERDICT- Page 1 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. Based on this Court's prior rulings and the evidence presented in ABI' s case in chief, 
the only allegedly fraudulent representations/omissions made by Mr. Rammell, Christa Beguesse 
Rammell ("Christa") and CBI to April Beguesse ("April"), are the following: 
• that CBI owned a library of proprietary titles valued at over $1 ,000,000; 
that CBI owned proprietary PageMaker software unique to CBI's business; 
that Christa had made a will; and 
that the Defendants failed to disclose that Mr. Rammell was an owner ofCBI 
at the time ABI took over CBI. 
2. As to ABI's breach of contract and warranty claims, the only two parties to the 
contract are ABI and CBL Mr. Rammell, individually, and the Estate cannot be liable for a contract 
to which they were not parties. 
3. Based on this Court's prior rulings and the evidence presented in ABI' s case in chief, 
the only breach of contract and warranty claims that remain against CBI are that CBI allegedly failed 
to provide ABI the following assets: 
• A library of proprietary files valued at over $1,000,000 and 
Proprietary PageMaker software unique to CBI's business. 
4. Besides ABI's punitive damages and request for attorney fees and costs, no other 
claims exist against any of the Defendants in this case for any other reason other than want is stated 
above. 
CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE OF CHRIST A BEGUESSE RAMMELL 
Fraud Claims Against The Estate 
5. ABI' s fraud claims against the Estate must fail because the Court ruled and repeatedly 
instructed the jury that, pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-202 and Rule 601 (b) of the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence, ABI is precluded from offering evidence of any representation made by Christ against the 
MOTION FOR DIRECTIVE VERDICT- Page 2 
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Estate. 
6. ABI's fraud claims against the Estate must fail. 
Breach of Contract and Warranty Claims Against The Estate 
7. The Estate is not a party to the contract. Therefore, ABI's breach of contract and 
warranty claims against the Estate must fail. 
8. Without a shred of evidence offered against the Estate, any and all claims made by 
ABI against it, must fail, including ABI's punitive damages claim and request for attorney fees and 
costs. 
CLAIMS AGAINST THE KEN RAMMELL, INDIVIDUALLY 
Fraud Claims Against Kenneth Rammell 
9. "To successfully bring an action for fraud, a plaintiff must establish the existence of 
the following elements: (1) a statement or a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; 
(4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that there be reliance; (6) the 
hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable reliance; 
and (9) resultant injury." Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 931 (2007). All nine elements must be 
proven by clear and convincing evidence. Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc., 150 Idaho 240, 
250 (2010). 
Representations Regarding The Titles, Their Value and PageMaker 
10. ABI has failed to show that it was ignorant of the falsity of Mr. Rammell's 
representation to ABI that CBI owned a ceratin library of titles and their value. April admitted at 
trial that she knew prior to purchasing CBI that CBI did not own the copyrights to the titles. April 
also admitted that, without owning the copyrights, ABI could not sell the titles. If the titles cannot 
MOTION FOR DIRECTIVE VERDICT- Page 3 
339 
be sold, they have no value except as they are pmi ofthe business relationship with the Rutter Group. 
ABI therefore knew that these representations, if they were made, were false. The evidence is 
undisputed that Plaintiff could sell the business with the permission of the customer that owns the 
files, which pennission has never been sought or denied. 
11. Also, as the Court previously determined, Plaintiff was aware that it needed the 
permission of the customer, which could take its typesetting work to another vendor at any time. 
Therefore, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was aware of the falsity of, or could not justifiably rely on, 
any alleged misstatements as to the value or ownership of the "library of files." 
12. ABI has also failed to show that it relied and/or justifiably relied on Mr. Rammell's 
representations to ABI regarding the proprietary software. 
13. In particular, April repeatedly testified that Mr. Rammell knew nothing about 
typesetting. Mr. Rammel1 agreed. His background was in accounting and his limited involvement 
in CBI was in preparing financial and tax information approximately one day a month. When ask 
what was Mr. Rarnme1l's involvement in CBI, April stated, "Not a thing." 
14. When ask which ofMr. Rammell 's representations ABI relied on in purchasing CBI, 
April stated, "Not one iota." Although April later stated that Mr. Rmnmell had concurred with 
Christa's alleged representations, it is clear that ABI did not rely on Mr. Rammell 's representations 
regarding the library of titles, their value and PageMaker. 
15. Even if ABI did rely on his representations, such is completely unjustifiable given 
that all the parties concede that Mr. Rammell knows nothing about typesetting, had extremely 
limited involvement in CBI and that April had worked extensively for CBI for approximately 15 
years prior to purchasing it. No reasonable juror could find otherwise. 
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16. The only evidence of false representations made by Mr. Rammell was that he 
misrepresented the value of the "library of files." With respect to all other fraud claims, either the 
misrepresentations were made by Christa Rammell, or the Plaintiff admits she did not rely on Mr. 
Rammell's statements. 
Representations Regarding The Existence of Christa's Will 
17. ABI has failed to show that Mr. Rammell 's representation were false regarding the 
existence of Christa's will. The Court stated on page 12, of its Memorandum Decision and Order, 
that "fraud cannot be based upon the mere failure to perfonn a promise." (citing Gillespie v. 
Mountain Park Estates, L.L.C., 142 Idaho 671, 673-674 (2006). However, an exception to this 
general rule applies when "the promise was accompanied by statements of existing fact which show 
the promisor's ability to perform the promise and those statements were false." I d. The evidence at 
trial is undisputed that at the time that ABI and CBI entered into their contract, Christa did in fact 
have a will (the "1999 will"). April also testified the 1999 will was revoked by Christa's execution 
of a new will in 2007. ABI's claim of fraud based on Christa's non-existing will is barred because 
the will actually existed and and any representations that a will existed were true. 
The Plaintiff presented no evidence regarding the contents of any will, so there is no fraud 
issue created by such evidence. The Plaintiff presented vague evidence that April Beguesse believed 
the will contained a tenn of the contract; however, this is merely evidence of a dispute as to the terms 
of the contract, and is not itself a fraud claim. Either the agreement included a provision that 
payments would cease on the death of a particular individual, or it did not. 
Failure to Disclose Mr. Rammell's Ownership Interest in CBI 
18. ABI has failed to show that Mr. Rammell 's omission concerning his ownership 
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interest in CBI was material to ABI its decision to purchase CBI. April offered conclusory testimony 
that she would not have bought the business, which has generated more than $3,000,000 in revenues 
since 2004 and has paid her almost $1,000,000, if she had known that Mr. RammeD was a part owner 
of CBI. However, she failed to explain why she would tum down such an opportunity to own a self-
sustaining business because ofMr. Rammell's ownership of shares in the selling corporation. No 
evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence, has been presented to the jury that this omission 
was material. 
19. ABI's fraud claims against Mr. Rammell, individually, must fail. 
Breach of Contract and Warranty Claims Against Kenneth Rammell 
20. Mr. Rammell, individually, is not a party to the contract. Therefore, ABI's breach 
of contract and warranty claims against Mr. Rammell, individually, must fail. 
21. Without any right to recover against Mr. Rallllnell, individually, any and all claims 
made by ABI against him, individually, must fail, including ABI' s punitive damages claim and 
request for attorney fees and costs. 
CLAIMS AGAINST CBI 
Fraud Claims Against CBI 
22. ABI has failed to present a prima facie case for fraud against CBI. 
23. The same arguments stated in Mr. Rammell's individual section above are 
incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full, and apply to Mr. Rammell in his capacity as 
an owner and agent ofCBI. 
24. The same arguments stated in Mr. Rammell's section above are incorporated herein 
by reference as if set forth in full, and apply to Christa and the Estate in her/its capacity as an owner 
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and agent/fonner owner and agent of CBI, excepting only paragraphs 13 through 15. For all other 
paragraphs, Christa's name is hereby substituted in the place ofMr. Ramme11. 
25. ABI has failed to show that it was ignorant of the falsity of Mr. Rammell' s 
representation to ABI that CBI owned proprietary P ageMaker software. On page 11, of its 
Memorandum Decision and Order, dated November 2, 2010, this Court stated, "Whether the 
software used in the business was proprietary or available to the public would reasonably have an 
effect on the purchase price of the business." April repeatedly testified at trial that anyone could buy 
PageMaker (for $600) off the shelf and that Ap1il had used PageMaker throughout her career. ABI 
knew Mr. Rammell' s representations were false. 
26. ABI's fraud claim against CBI must fail. 
Breach of Contract and Warranty Claims Against CBI 
27. The only claims that remain against CBI are ABI's breach of contract and warranty 
claims. 
ORAL ARGUMENT is hereby requested, in which evidence and testimony may be 
presented. 
vt 
Dated this ,-z day of April, 2012 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & 
BAILEY, CHARTERED 
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Case No. CV-09-2767 
On the 10th day of April, 2011, a jury t convened in 
open court in the Centennial Courtroom before the Honorable Joel 
E. Tingey, District Judge, in Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Je Brunson and Ms. Lindsey Lofgren appeared on behalf 
of the Plaintiff. Plainti April Beguesse was present at counsel 
table. 
Mr. David Alexander and Mr. Jason Flaig appeared on behalf of 
the Defendants. Defendant Kenneth Rammell was present at counsel 
table. 
Prior to court convening, the jury panel viewed a film 
regarding jury service. 
Upon inquiry from the Court, the parties stated they are 
345 
ready to proceed. 
This being the time for the appearance of the jury, the Jury 
Commissioner called the roll and the following jurors were 
present: Ariel Lea Jackson, Stephen Maria, Tessa Thurber, Lawrene 
Freckleton, Linda ford, Janet Corson-Stanton, Kay Vindel, Raymond 
Canuel, Rhett Garner, John Howze, Melinda Brewer, Sterling Madsen, 
Matt Morgan, Steven Hansen, Richard Schmude, Allison Honeycutt, 
Taylor Evans, Anne Howell, Luke Doman, Timothy Young, Kristina 
Ott, Debbie Empey, Richard Kennedy, Jeremy Miller, Rebeca Hagen, 
Teri Bachman Kotansky, Jessica Keck, Linda Rhodes, Michael 
Stewart, Frank Greenough Jr., Lita Thornock, Zachary Buckland, 
Elizabeth Olsen, Daniel Taylor, Douglas Meeks, Lee Parsons, Deanna 
Forbes, Lou Ann Souba, Allison Gottwalt, Stacy Thorngren, Deven 
Lewis, Tyler Zufelt, Chad Webb, Jennifer Bird, Cameron Dennett, 
Diana Alquicira, Lynn Moore, Michael Kelsch, Karl Willumson, 
Jessica Brammer, Laurie Pena, Katherine Owens, Teo Cutler, Barry 
Lewis, Jasmine Gellings-Peterson. 
The following jurors, being duly summoned, failed to answer 
the roll call: Janie Mason, Linda Evans, Kerry Weber, and Larae 
Cook. 
Under the direction of the Court, the initial jury panel of 
23 took their place in the jury box. 
The Court introduced the court staff, counsel and the 
parties. 
The Court advised the jury panel regarding voir dire and 
JURY TRIAL MINUTE ENTRY 2 
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challenges for cause. 
Under the direction of the Court, the clerk administered the 
oath of voir dire to the jurors as to their quali ions to 
serve at this term as well as to serve in this cause now pending. 
The Court conducted voir dire examination. Matt Morgan seat 
#14 was excused. Teri Kotansky was called to take seat #14. 
Lawrene Freckleton seat #4 was excused. Ms. Jessica Keck was 
ed to take seat #4. Jeremy Miller seat #19 was excused. 
Linda Rhodes was called to take seat #19. Kristina Ott was 
excused from seat #23. Michael Stewart was called to fill seat 
#23. Taylor Evans seat #18 was excused. Frank Greenough Jr was 
called to fill seat #18. Richard Schmude seat #16 was excused. 
Lita Thornock was called to fill seat #16. Luke Doman seat #21 
was excused. Zachary Buckland was called to fill seat #21. 
Mr. Brunson conducted voir dire examination on behalf of the 
Plaintiff. Mr. Brunson passed the panel for cause. 
Mr. Alexander conducted voir dire examination. 
Trial recessed for a morning break. 
Trial continued at 11:10 a.m. with all parties resent. 
Mr. Alexander continued voir dire examination. Mr. Alexander 
passed the panel for cause. 
The Court instructed the jury panel regarding peremptory 
challenges. 
Mr. Brunson exercised 5 peremptory challenges on behalf of 
the Plaintiff. 
JURY TRIAL MINUTE ENTRY 3 
347 
Mr. Alexander exercised 5 peremptory challenges on behalf of 
the Defendants. 
The Court dismissed those jurors challenged or not cal to 
serve in this cause. Upon inquiry from the Court, counsel 
accepted the jury panel as seated. 
The following jurors were sworn to well and truly try this 
cause: Stephen Maria, Linda Ford, Richard Kennedy, Janet Carson-
Stanton, Katy Mejia, John Howze, Melinda Brewer, Sterling Madsen, 
Teri Kotansky, Allison Honeycutt, Frank Greenough Jr., Timothy 
Young, and Michael Stewart. 
The Court advised the jury regarding trial procedure and 
instructed the jury prior to releasing them for noon break. Trial 
will resume at 1:10 p.m. The jury was led from courtroom. 
Court and counsel met to review the proposed jury 
instructions. 
Mr. Brunson advised that he has not been provided exhibits 
from Mr. Alexander. Mr. Alexander will provide the exhibits 
prior to start of trial this afternoon. 
Trial recessed. 
On the 10th day of April, 2011, a jury trial reconvened in 
open court in Courtroom III before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, 
District Judge, in Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
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Mr. Jeff Brunson and Ms. Lindsey Lofgren appeared on behalf 
of the Plaintiff. Plaintiff April Beguesse was present at counsel 
table. 
Mr. David Alexander and Mr. Jason Flaig appeared on behalf of 
the Defendants. Defendant Kenneth Rammell was present at counsel 
table. 
The jury was not present. 
The Court advised counsel that it would be including the 
instruction on corporate parties with the preliminary jury 
instructions to the jury. 
Mr. Brunson presented Plaintiff's motion to exclude 
witnesses. Mr. Alexander opposed the motion. 
The Court granted the motion and will exclude all witnesses 
with the exception of non-party witnesses. 
The jury was brought into the courtroom. All members of the 
jury were present. The Court conducted a roll call of the jury. 
The Court addressed the jury panel and then read preliminary 
instructions nos. 1-13. 
Mr. Brunson presented Plaintiff's opening statement. 
Mr. Alexander presented Defendant's opening statement. 
Ms. April Beguesse was called as a witness, placed under oath 
and took the witness stand. Mr. Brunson inquired of Ms. Beguesse. 
Argument without the presence of the jury was requested. The 
jury was led from the courtroom. 
Mr. Brunson presented argument re: objection under 601(b). 
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Mr. Alexander responded to the motion. Mr. Brunson presented 
rebuttal argument. Further argument was heard. 
Trial recessed. 
Trial continued at 2:50 p.m. with Court and counsel present. 
The jury was not present. 
The Court made its ruling. 
The jury was brought into the courtroom at 2:56 p.m. Roll 
call of the jury was waived. 
Ms. April Beguesse retook the witness stand subject to direct 
examination by Mr. Brunson. Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 - 1/07/01 
letter from C. Beguesse to Rutter - was marked, offered and 
admitted without objection. Plaintiff's Exhibit 9- 12/22/03 
letter from C. Beguesse to Rutter - was marked, offered and 
admitted without objection. Plaintiff's Exhibit 14- ABI codes 
and instructions - was marked, offered, and admitted without 
objection. Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 -lease agreement dated 1/01/04 
- was marked, offered, and admitted. 
Argument without the presence of the jury was requested. The 
Court instructed the jury prior to excusing them break. The 
jury was led from the courtroom. 
Mr. Brunson presented argument in support of the line of 
questioning. Mr. Alexander presented argument in opposition. 
Further argument was heard. The Court ruled that it will take it 
on a question by question basis. 
Trial recessed. 
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Trial continued at 4:02 p.m. with all parties present. Roll 
call of the jury was waived. 
Ms. April Beguesse retook the witness stand subject to direct 
examination by Mr. Brunson. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to releasing them for the 
evening. Trial will continue at 9:00 a.m. on Wednesday, April 11, 
2012. Trial was in recess for the evening. 
On the 11th day of April, 2011, a jury trial reconvened in 
open court in Courtroom III before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, 
District Judge, in Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Jeff Brunson and Ms. Lindsey Lofgren appeared on behalf 
of the Plainti 
table. 
Plainti April Beguesse was present at counsel 
Mr. David Alexander and Mr. Jason Flaig appeared on behalf of 
the Defendants. Defendant Kenneth Rammell was present at counsel 
table. 
Ms. April Beguesse retook the witness stand. Ms. Beguesse 
was still under oath. Mr. Alexander inquired on direct 
examination. Defendants' Exhibit B - cash flow estimate - was 
marked, offered and admitted. Defendants' Exhibit A - list of 
publications by Rutter Group - was marked, offered and admitted. 
Trial recessed for morning break. 
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Trial resumed at 10:16 a.m. with all parties present. The 
jury was present. Roll call of the jury was waived. 
Ms. Beguesse retook the witness stand subject to cross-
examination by Mr. Alexander. 
The Court instructed the jury before recessing for a morning 
break. 
Trial continued at 11:28 a.m. with all parties present. The 
jury was present. Roll call was waived. 
Mr. Alexander continued cross-examination of Ms. April 
Beguesse. Plainti 's Exhibit 1- ABI payment ledger- was 
marked, offered and admitted. 
Mr. Brunson inquired on redirect examination. Ms. Beguesse 
was excused from the witness stand. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to recessing for lunch 
break. Trial will resume at 1:00 p.m. 
Trial resumed at 1:06 p.m. with all parties and jury present. 
Mr. Stephen Martin was called as a witness on behalf of the 
Plaintiff. Mr. Martin was placed under oath and took the witness 
stand. Mr. Brunson inquired on direct examination. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 45- Stephen Martin's handwritten notes- was marked, 
offered and admitted. Mr. Alexander cross-examined. Mr. Brunson 
inquired on redirect examination. Mr. Martin was excused from the 
witness stand. 
Ms. Linda Diamond Raznick was called as a witness by 
deposition transcript. Ms. Lindsey Lofgren read the responses of 
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Ms. Raznick. Mr. Brunson inquired on direct examination. Mr. 
Alexander cross-examined by deposition. Mr. Brunson inquired on 
rect examination. The witness was excused. 
Trial recessed for an afternoon break. 
Court and counsel met in the courtroom for argument without 
the presence of the jury at 2:12p.m. 
Mr. Brunson advised that his next witness would be Rick 
Trulson. Mr. Alexander presented an objection to calling Mr. 
Trulson. Mr. Brunson presented argument in support calling Mr. 
Trulson. Mr. Alexander presented rebuttal argument. The Court 
ruled that Mr. Trulson could not be called at this time. 
The jury was brought into the courtroom at 2:25 p.m. 
Mr. Kenneth Rammell was placed under oath and took the 
witness stand. Mr. Brunson inquired of Mr. Rammell on direct 
examination. Plaintiff's Exhibit 27a- Schedule K-1 Christa 
Beguesse 2000 tax return - was marked, offered, objection raised, 
objection overruled, and admitted. Volume 1 of the Deposition of 
Kenneth Rammell was published. Volume 2 of the Deposition of 
Kenneth Rammell was published. 
Mr. Alexander cross-examined Mr. Rammell. 
Trial recessed for an afternoon break. The jury was led from 
the courtroom. 
Trial resumed at 3:51 p.m. with all parties present. The 
jury was present. 
Mr. Alexander continued cross-examination of Mr. RAmmell. 
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Mr. Brunson inquired on redirect. Mr. Rammell was excused from 
the witness stand. 
Ms. Renee Trulson Heller was called as a witness by 
deposition transcript. Ms. Lindsey Lofgren read the responses of 
Ms. Heller. Mr. Brunson inquired on direct examination. Mr. 
Alexander moved to strike the testimony of Ms. Heller. The Court 
overruled the motion. The witness was excused. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to releasing them for the 
evening. Trial will resume at 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, April 12, 
2012. Trial was in recess for the evening. 
On the 12th day of April, 2011, a jury trial reconvened in 
open court in Courtroom III before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, 
District Judge, in Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Jeff Brunson and Ms. Lindsey Lofgren appeared on behalf 
of the Plaintiff. Plaintiff April Beguesse was present at counsel 
table. 
Mr. David Alexander and Mr. Jason Flaig appeared on behalf of 
the Defendants. Defendant Kenneth Rammell was present at counsel 
table. 
The jury was not present. 
Mr. Alexander presented an oral motion to exclude witness 
Rick Trulson. Mr. Brunson presented argument in opposition to the 
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motion to exclude. Further argument was heard. 
The Court ruled that Mr. Trulson will be allowed to testi 
but it cannot be specific. 
The jury was brought into the courtroom at 10:23 a.m. All 
members of the jury were present. Roll call of the jury was 
waived. 
Mr. Rick Trulson was placed under oath and took the witness 
stand. Mr. Brunson inquired of Mr. Trulson on direct examination. 
Mr. Trulson was excused from the witness stand. 
Plaintiff rested. 
Mr. Brunson requested argument without the presence of the 
jury. The Court instructed the jury before they were released for 
a morning break while the Court conducted business. 
Mr. Brunson presented a motion to submit the issue of 
punitive damages to the jury. The Court denied the motion for 
punitive damages. 
Mr. Alexander presented Defendants' motion for directed 
verdict. Mr. Brunson presented argument in oppos ion to the 
motion. Mr. Alexander presented rebuttal argument. 
The Court denied the motion in part and granted the motion in 
part. 
Trial was in recess. 
Trial continued at 11:24 a.m. with all parties present. The 
jury was present. Roll call of the jury was waived. 
Mr. Stephen Hall was placed under oath and took the witness 
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stand. Mr. Alexander inquired of Mr. Hall. Mr. Hall was excused 
from the witness stand. 
Mr. Kenneth Rammell was recalled to the witness stand. Mr. 
Rammell was still under oath. Mr. Alexander inquired of Mr. 
Rammell. Mr. Brunson cross-examined. Mr. Alexander inquired on 
redirect examination. Mr. Rammell was excused from the stand. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to releasing them for 
lunch break. Trial will continue at 1:15 p.m. The jury was led 
from the courtroom. 
Trial resumed at 1:20 p.m. with all parties present. All 
members of the jury were present. 
Mr. Alexander advised that Defendants rested. 
Mr. Brunson rested rebuttal. Mr. Brunson requested argument 
without the presence of the jury. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to conducting a recess. 
The Court advised the jury that Court and counsel will be working 
on jury instructions and it may take a while. The members of the 
jury were instructed to return by 2:30 p.m. The jury was led from 
the courtroom. 
Mr. Brunson presented Plaintiff's motion for directed verdict 
as to counterclaims. Mr. Alexander presented argument in 
opposition to the motion. Mr. Brunson presented rebuttal 
argument. 
The Court will dismiss counts 2 and 4; will not dismiss count 
3 . 
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Trial was in recess. 
Due to computer problems the jury was excused at 2:30 p.m. 
and instructed to return on Friday, April 13, 2012 at 9:00 a.m. 
Court reconvened at 4:05 the purpose of the jury 
instruction conference. Present were the Court, counsel and court 
personnel. The jury was not present. 
The Court noted the Court's proposed instructions were 
provided to counsel earlier and, upon inquiry from the Court, 
counsel stated they have had an opportunity to review the proposed 
instructions. Preliminary instructions 1-13 were read to the jury 
at the start of trial. 
The parties went through each instruction individually. The 
Court will take the objections under advisement and making 
modifications as necessary. Mr. Brunson advised for the record 
that he objected to all instructions provided and not given. Mr. 
Alexander advised for the record that he objected to all 
instructions provided and not given. 
Final instructions will be provided to counsel in the 
morning. We will go over them again prior to going before the 
jury. 
Court recessed at 5:00 p.m. 
On the 13th day of April, 2011, a jury trial reconvened in 
open court in Courtroom III before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, 
District Judge, in Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
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Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Jeff Brunson appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff April Beguesse was present at couns table. 
Mr. David Alexander appeared on behalf of the Defendants. 
Defendant Kenneth Ra~.ell was present at counsel table. 
The jury was not present. 
Court and counsel met for a supplemental jury instruction 
conference. Mr. Brunson brought up objections to the equitable 
stopper instruction, 34.5, 35 and the verdict form. Mr. Brunson 
advised for the record that he objected to all instructions 
provided and not given. Mr. Alexander advised for the record that 
he objected to all instructions provided and not given. 
Trial recessed. 
Trial continued at 9:18 a.m. with all parties present. All 
members of the jury were present. 
The Court read the final jury instructions. 
Mr. Brunson presented Plaintiff's closing argument. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to conducting a morning 
recess. The jury was led from the courtroom. 
Trial continued at 10:41 a.m. with all parties present. All 
members of the jury were present. 
Mr. Alexander presented Defendants' closing argument. 
Mr. Brunson presented rebuttal argument. 
Ms. Allison Honeycutt was chosen as the alternate juror. The 
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Court thanked Ms. Honeycutt for her jury service and excused her. 
Under the direction of the Court, the liff was 
administered the oath by the Clerk. 
The jury retired at 11:47 a.m. for deliberation in the charge 
of the Baili 
Court recessed at 11:47 a.m. 
Court reconvened at 5:04 p.m. in open court. Counsel waived 
roll call of the jury. 
Upon being asked by the Court, the jury foreman stated they 
had arrived at a verdict and handed the verdict to the Baili who 
delivered to the Court. Under the direction of the Court, the 
clerk read and filed the verdict as follows: 




KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, ESTATE of 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by 





Case No. CV-09-2767 
we, the jury answer the interrogatories in the Verdict From as follows: 
SECTION 1 - PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS 
Question No. 1: Are Plaintiff's claims of fraud barred by the statute of limitations? 
Answer: Yes No X 
Question No. 2: Did Kenneth Rammell commit fraud? 
Answer: Yes X 
Question No. 3: Did Christa Beguesse, Inc. commit fraud? 
Answer: Yes X No 
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Question No. 4: Did Christa Beguesse commit fraud? 
Answer: Yes X No 
If you answered "yes" to questions 2, 3 or 4, answer Question No. 5. If you answered 
"no" to questions 2, 3 and 4, proceed to Question No. 6. 
Question No. 5: What is the total amount of damages to Plaintiff proximately caused by 
the fraud? 
,000.00 __ 
Question No. 6: Is Plaintiff's breach of contract and warranty claim as to a library of 
files barred by the statute of limitations? 
Answer: No X 
Question No. 7: Did Christa Beguesse, Inc. breach its contract and/or warranty with 
Plaintiff as to a library of files? 
Answer: Yes No 
If you answered "yes" to Question No. 7, proceed to Question No. 8. If you answered 
"no" to Question No. 7, proceed to Question No. 9. 
Question No. 8: what is the total amount of damages to Plaintiff proximately caused by 
the breach of contract and/or warranty, not otherwise awarded above? 
$_190,013. 
Question No. 9: Is Plaintiff's breach of contract and warranty claim as to proprietary 
software barred by the statute of limitations? 
Answer: Yes 
Question No. 10: Did Christa Beguesse, Inc. breach its contract and/or warranty with 
Plaintiff as to proprietary software? 
Answer: No 
If you answered "yes" to Question No. 10, proceed to Question No. 11. If you answered 
"no" to Question 10, proceed to Question No. 12. 
Question No. 11: What is the total amount of damages to Plaintiff proximately caused by 
the breach of contract and/or warranty as to proprietary software, not otherwise awarded 
above? 
SECTION II- CBI'S CLAIM 
Question No. 12: Did April Beguesse, Inc. breach its contract with Christa Beguesse, 
Inc.? 
Answer: 
If you answered "yes" to Question No. 12, answer Question No. 13. If you answered "no" 
to Question 12, sign the verdict form and inform the bailiff that you are done. 
Question No. 13: What is the total amount of damages to Christa Beguesse, Inc., 
proximately cause by the breach of contract? 
DATED this 13th day of April, 2012 
Is! John 
Upon inquiry from the Court, the jury panel stated that this 
is in fact their verdict. 
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Upon inquiry from the Court, counsel stated they do wish to 
have the jury polled. The Court inquired of each member of the 
jury to which they replied that was their verdict. 
The Court read a final jury instruction and thanked and 
excused the jurors at 5:10p.m. 
Court was thus adjourned at 5:10p.m. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
Now that you have been selected and sworn as the jury to try this case, I want to go over 
with you what will be happening. To start the trial, I will read to you some of the instructions as 
to the law that applies in this case. The attorney for the plaintiff or plaintiffs will make an 
opening statement, and then the attorney for the defendant or defendants may make an opening 
statement. The attorney for the defendant or defendants may save his opening statement until 
later. The opening statement is intended to inform you about the party's case, and what is 
claimed by a party, and what evidence the party intends to produce for you. However, the 
opening statement is not evidence. 
After the opening statements, each party offers evidence to support their respective 
claims. The plaintiff or plaintiffs proceed first and offer all of their evidence in support of their 
claims. Then the defendant or defendants proceed to offer all of their evidence in support of their 
defenses. Thereafter, the plaintiff or plaintiffs may, but are not required to, offer evidence to 
rebut the evidence presented by the defendant or defendants. 
After all of the evidence has been presented, I will read to you the rest of your 
instructions. In those instructions I will tell you what the law is and will tell you what you will 
have to decide. 
Then the trial concludes with the closing arguments of the attorneys for both sides. 
Finally, you will be taken to the jury room where you can deliberate on your verdict in privacy. 
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These instructions define your duties as members of the jury and the law that applies to 
this case. 
Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to 
those facts, and in this way to decide the case. In so doing, you must follow these instructions. 
You must consider them as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. Neither 
sympathy nor prejudice should influence you in your deliberations. Faithful performance by you 
ofthese duties is vital to the administration of justice. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This 
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered and received, and any 
stipulated or admitted facts. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine which of the 
witnesses you believe, what portion of their testimony you accept, and what weight you attach to 
it. 
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial, 
I may sustain an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it or to an 
offered exhibit without receiving it into evidence. I will do this when the question calls for 
testimony that was not admissible or when the exhibit itself was inadmissible. In reaching your 
decision, you may not consider such a question or exhibit or speculate as to what the answer or 
exhibit would have shown. In addition, where an answer is given or an exhibit received, I may 
instruct that it be stricken from the record, that you disregard it and that you dismiss it from your 
minds. I will do this when it becomes apparent that the evidence was inadmissible only after it 
had been presented to you. In reaching your decision, you may not consider this testimony or 
366 
exhibit. Except as explained in this instruction, none of my rulings are intended by me to 
indicate any opinion concerning the evidence in this case. 
The arguments and remarks of the attorneys involved in this case are intended to help you 
in understanding the evidence and applying the instructions, but they are not themselves 
evidence. If any argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, then you should disregard it. 
However, there are two exceptions to this rule: (1) an admission of fact by one attorney is 
binding on his party; and (2) stipulations of fact by all attorneys are binding on all parties. 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the 
trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what 
weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience 
and background of your lives. In your everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you 
believe, what you believe and how much weight you attach to what you are told. The same 
considerations that you use in your everyday dealings in making these decisions are the 
considerations which you should apply in your deliberations. 
In evaluating the testimony, you should consider such items as: the interest, bias or 
prejudice of any witness in the outcome of this case; the age and appearance of the witness and 
the manner in which the witness gives his or her testimony; the opportunity that the witness had 
to observe the facts about which he or she testified; the contradiction, if any, of a witness's 
testimony by other evidence; any statements made by the witness at other times that are 
inconsistent with his or her present testimony; any evidence regarding a witness's general 
reputation for truth, honesty or integrity; and any felony conviction of a witness. 
367 
In evaluating the exhibits, you should consider such items as: the circumstances under 
which the exhibit was prepared; and the probability that the exhibit accurately reflects what it is 
intended to show in light of the other evidence of the case. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO.3 
If during the trial I may say or do anything which suggests to you that I am inclined to 
favor the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by any 
such suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express, nor will I intend to intimate, an.y 
opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief; what facts are or are not 
established; or what inferences should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of mine 
seems to indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard it. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
If you wish, you may take notes to help you remember what witnesses said. If you do 
take notes, please keep them to yourself until you and your fellow jurors go to the jury room to 
decide the case. You should not let note-taking distract you so that you do not hear other 
answers by witnesses. When you leave at night, please leave your notes in the jury room. 
If you do not take notes, you should rely on your own memory of what was said and not be 
overly influenced by the notes of other jurors. In addition, you cannot assign to one person the 
duty of taking notes for all of you. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. :) 
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give his or her opinion 
on that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should consider the 
qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for his or her opinion. You are 
not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. _Q_ 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that directly 
proves one of the facts on which a party has the burden of proof in the case, without resorting to 
inference. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves one of the facts on which a 
party has the burden of proof in the case, by means of proving one or more facts from which the 
fact at issue may be inferred. 
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the degree 
of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is respected for 
such convincing force as it may carry. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. I 
Certain evidence may be admitted for a limited purpose. At the time this evidence is 
admitted you will be instructed as to the limited purpose for which it is admitted. Do not 
consider such evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose for which it is admitted. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO._$_ 
Certain evidence may be presented to you by deposition. A deposition is testimony taken 
under oath before the trial and preserved in writing or upon videotape. This evidence is entitled 
to neither more nor less consideration than you would give the same testimony had tl1e witness 
testified here in the courtroom. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO.~ 
From time to time during the trial it may become necessary for me to talk with the 
attorneys out of the hearing of the jury, either by having a conference at this bench when the jury 
is present in the courtroom, or by calling a recess. Please understand that while you are waiting, 
we are working. The purpose of these conferences is not to keep relevant information from you, 
but to decide how certain evidence is to be treated under the rules of evidence and to avoid 
confusion and error. 
We will, of course, do what we can to keep the number and length of these conferences to 
a minimum. I may not always grant an attorney's request for a conference. Do not consider my 
granting or denying a request for a conference as any indication of my opinion of the case or 
what your verdict should be. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. lQ_ 
It is important that as jurors and officers of this court you obey the following instructions 
at any time you leave the jury box, whether it be for recesses of the court during the day or when 
you leave the courtroom to go home at night. 
First, do not talk about this case either among yourselves or with anyone else during the 
course of the trial. In fairness to all of the parties, you should keep an open mind throughout the 
trial and not form or express an opinion about the case. You should only reach your decision 
after you have heard all the evidence, after you have heard my final instructions and after the 
final arguments. You may discuss this case with the other members of the jury only after it is 
submitted to you for your decision. All such discussion should take place in the jury room. 
Second, do not let any person talk about this case in your presence. If anyone does talk 
about it, tell them you are a juror on the case. If they won't stop talking, report that to the bailiff 
as soon as you are able to do so. You should not tell any of your fellow jurors about what has 
happened. 
Third, during this trial do not talk with any of the parties, their lawyers or any witnesses. 
By this, I mean not only do not talk about the case, but do not talk at all, even to pass the time of 
day. In no other way can all parties be assured of the fairness they are entitled to expect from 
you as JUrors. 
Fourth, during this trial do not make any investigation of this case or inquiry outside of 
the courtroom on your own. Do not go to any place mentioned in the testimony without an 
explicit order from me to do so. You must not consult any books, dictionaries, encyclopedias or 
any other source of information unless I specifically authorize you to do so. 
Fifth, do not read about the case in the newspapers. Do not listen to radio or television 
broadcasts about the trial. You must base your verdict solely on what is presented in court and 
not upon any newspaper, radio, television or other account of what may have happened. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. tl 
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you in the jury room my 
instructions concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into 
evidence and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings. 
The instructions are part of the official court record. For this reason please do not alter 
them or mark on them in any way. 
The instructions are numbered for convenience in referring to specific instructions. 
There may or may not be gaps in the numbering of the instructions. If there are gaps, you should 
not concern yourselves about such gaps. 
378 
INSTRUCTION NO. /'2---
Any statement by me identifYing a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I have 
advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to be decided. 
37~) 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. l3 
The corporations involved in this case are entitled to the same fair and unprejudiced 
treatment that an individual would be under like circumstances. You should decide this case with 
the same impartiality that you would use in deciding a case between individuals. 
380 
INSTRUCTION NO. '2. d 
Certain evidence was presented to you by deposition or other prior testimony. This 
testimony was taken under oath before the trial and preserved in writing This evidence is entitled 
to the same consideration you would give had the witnesses testified from the witness stand. 
381 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ \ 
In this case, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. Specifically, the 
testimony of April Beguesse as to statements made by Christa Beguesse may not be considered as 
evidence in supporting a claim against the Estate of Christa Beguesse. Such evidence however 
may be used for any other purpose. 
382 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1--2-
A.n oral agreement that contains all of the elements of a contract is a binding contract. 
383 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 2- '3 
A contract may be amended or modified by an agreement of the parties. This requires all 
of the elements of any other contract. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 2 ~ 
The plaintiff and Defendant Christa Beguesse, Inc. have each claimed that the other 
breached a contract. The burden of proving each of the following propositions rests with the party 
asserting the breach: 
1. A contract existed between parties; 
2. The other party breached the contract; 
3. The party has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions have 
been proved by the party asserting the breach, then your verdict on this issue should be in favor 
of that party. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the propositions 
in this instruction has not been proved by the party asserting the breach, your verdict should be 
for the other party. 
385 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. '~-- s-
The terms of the oral agreement between Christa Beguesse, Inc., and April Beguesse, Inc., 
are in dispute. You must determine what was agreed to by the parties. In making this 
determination you should consider, from the evidence, the following: 
1. The contract must be construed as a whole, including all of the circumstances 
giving rise to it, to give consistent meaning to every part of it. 
2. Language must be given its ordinary meaning, unless you find from the evidence 
that a special meaning was intended. 
3. Any communications, conduct or dealings between the contracting parties 
showing how they construed the contract may be considered, provided that such may not 
completely change the agreement or construe one term inconsistently with the remainder of the 
terms. 
4. The contract should be construed to avoid any contradiction or absurdities. 
Persons within a specialized field are deemed to have contracted with reference to any 
generally known and customarily accepted language in that field, unless you find from the 
evidence that this was not intended. 
This Court previously ruled that the "Lease Agreement" (Exhibit 2) is not an enforceable 
contract. However, that document may be evidence as to the actual agreement entered into by the 
Parties. 
386 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. -z '{ 
An express warranty is a warranty created by words or actions of the seller. Express 
warranties may be created by affirmations of fact or promises made by the seller to the buyer 
relating to the goods that becomes the basis of the bargain; (2) a description of the goods that 
becomes partf of the basis of the bargain; or (3) a sample or model made part of the basis of the 
bargain. 
With regard to Plaintiffs claim for breach of warranty as to a library of files and 
proprietary software, Plaintiffhas the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. That CBI made a warranty as part of the sale of the business; 
2. That CBI breached the warranty; 
3. That ABI was damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of damages. 
An affirmation merely of the value ofthe goods or a statement purporting to be merely 
the seller's opinion or commendation ofthe goods does not create a warranty. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has 
been proved, then you should find for ABI on this issue. If you find from your consideration of 
all the evidence that each of these propositions has not been proved, then you should find for 
CBI on this issue. 
387 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. '2 c, 
With regard to Plaintiffs claim of fraud, the plaintiff has the burden of proving each of 
the following propositions by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. That the defendants stated a fact to the plaintiff; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. The defendants either knew the statement was false or were unaware of whether 
the statement was true at the time the statement was made. 
5. The plaintiff did not know that the statement was false; 
6. The defendants intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the statement and act upon it 
in a manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. The plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the statement; 
8. The plaintiff reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances; 
9. The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false 
statement. 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to the plaintiff, and the amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the elements of fraud have 
been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff on 
this issue. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing 
propositions has not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be 
for the defendants. 
388 
INSTRUCTION NO. Z q · / 
The term "agent" refers to a person authorized by another, called the "principal," to act 
for or in the place of the principal. The principal is responsible for any act of the agent within the 
agent's scope of authority. 
389 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. )v 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if 
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably 
true than not true. 
390 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. o l 
When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by clear and convincing 
evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is highly probable that such proposition is true. 
This is a higher burden than the general burden that the proposition is more probably true than 
not true. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO } 2-
A "material breach of contract," as that term is used in these instructions, means a breach 
that defeats a fundamental purpose of the contract. 
392 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 3 3 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, in natural or probable 
sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage complained of. It need not be the only 
cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is 
not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway. 
393 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 3~ 
"Materiality" refers to the importance of the alleged representation in determining 
the party's course of action. A representation is material if (a) a reasonable person would 
attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining a choice of action in the 
transaction in question, or (b) the person making the representation knows or has reason 
to know that the recipient is likely to regard the matter as important in determining the 
choice of action, whether or not a reasonable person would so consider. 
394 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 3 Y · ( 
Under the applicable statute of limitations, Plaintiff was required to file its 
complaint of fraud within three years from the date the Plaintiff knew or 
reasonably should have known of the facts constituting the alleged fraud. Actual 
knowledge will be inferred if the allegedly aggrieved party could have discovered 
the fraud by the exercise of due diligence. It is for you to determine whether the 
claims of fraud are barred by the statute of limitations. 
395 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ ~· '2-
The statute of limitations for Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract and warranty claim 
regarding a library of files is four years and begins to run from the time ABI knew of the Rutter 
Group's claim of ownership interest in the library of files. It is for you to determine whether the 
statute of limitations bars the breach of contract and warranty claim as to library of files. 
396 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
The statute of limitations for Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract and warranty claim 
regarding proprietary software is four years and begins to run from the time the Parties entered 
into the contract. Plaintiffs complaint, filed on May 8, 2009, was filed more than four years after 
that alleged breach of contract. The doctrine of estoppel may apply to bar the application of the 
statute of limitations to this claim. 
Plaintiff bears the burden of proving the elements of estoppel which are as follows: 
( 1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or constructive 
knowledge of the truth; 
(2) that the party asserting estoppel did not know or could not discover the truth; 
(3) that the false representation or concealment was made with the intent that it be relied 
upon; and 
( 4) that the person to whom the representation was made, or from whom the facts were 
concealed, relied and acted upon the representation or concealment to his prejudice. 
Even if the elements of estoppel are met thereby barring the application of the statute of 
limitations, that bar does not last forever. Instead, it lasts only for a reasonable time after the 
party asserting estoppel disco~ers or reason9:b]y ~oul9_have discovered the truth. Once the party 
claiming estoppel discovers the truth with respect to the alleged misrepresentations upon which 
the estoppel is based, that party must act with due diligence in asserting the claim. 
Estoppel does not bar the application of the statute of limitations when plaintiff learned of 
an allegedly concealed fact within adequate time to bring a lawsuit prior to the running of the 
statute of limitations. 
It is for you to determine whether estoppel applies barring the application of the statute of 
limitations to the breach of contract and warranty claim as to proprietary software. 
397 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 3 C, 
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to 
whether any party is entitled to damages. 
398 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. '3> 7 
If the jury decides that ABI is entitled to recover from CBI for breach of contract 
or fraud, the jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly 
compensate ABI for any damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from the 
breach or fraud. 
39B 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. )"() 
If the jury decides that CBI is entitled to recover from ABI for breach of contract, 
the jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate 
CBI for any damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from the breach. 
480 
INSTRUCTION NO. ) 9 
If you decide for the plaintiff on the question of liability with respect to its breach of 
warranty claim, you must then fix the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly 
compensate ABI for its damages. The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the 
difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the 
value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show 
proximate damages of a different amount. 
Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved by the evidence is for you to 
determine. 
401 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. yo 
A party is not entitled to duplicative damages. For example, the same damages which 
may be awarded for a breach of contract may not again be awarded for breach of warranty or 
fraud. 
402 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. L{O ( 
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the damage and 
prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such care cannot be 
recovered. 
403 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 40.2 
Even though Plaintiff claims may be barred by a statute of limitations, damages 
proximately arising from such claims may nevertheless be used to offset damages asserted in 
CBI's counterclaim. Accordingly, regardless of your finding as to the application of the statute 
of limitations, you will be asked to determine whether CBI committed fraud and/or breached a 
contract or warr&.'1ty and any damages arising therefrom. 
404 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 41 
I have outlined for you the rules of law applicable to this case and have told you of some 
of the matters which you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few 
minutes counsel will present their closing remarks to you, and then you will retire to the jury 
room for your deliberations. 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of their deliberations are important. It 
is rarely productive for a juror, at the outset, to make an emphatic expression of his opinion on 
the case or to state how he intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, his sense of 
pride may be aroused; and he may hesitate to change his position, even if shown that it is wrong. 
Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but are judges. For you, as for me, there can 
be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views; and deliberate with the objective 
of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of 
you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and 
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. 
405 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. '-! L-
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreperson, who will preside 
over your deliberations. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as 
nine or more of you shall have agreed upon a verdict, you should fill it out, and have it signed. If 
your verdict is unanimous, your foreperson alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than 
the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, you will notify the bailiff, who 
will then return you into open court. 
406 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. L/) 
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send 
a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me 
by any means other than such a note. 
During your deliberation, you are never to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any of 
the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me. 
407 
INSTRUCTION NO. _jj 
Members of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that at least 
three-fourths of the jury agree. Your verdict must represent the considered judgment 
of each juror agreeing to it. 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a 
view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual 
judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an 
impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of 
your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your 
opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as 
to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow 
jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. 
You are not partisans. You are judges - judges of the facts. Your sole 
interest is to ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case. 
408 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICL1-£. DI~ifl)J~T0 n "'"""' 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILfEUL 
APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Case No. CV-09-2767 
Plaintiff, 
vs. VERDICT FORM 
KENNETH RAMMEL, an individual, 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, ESTATE OF CHRISTA 
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by its personal 
representative, Kenneth Rammell, 
Defendants, Counterclaimant. 
We, the jury answer the interrogatories in the Verdict Form as follows: 
SECTION 1 -PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS 
Question No. 1: Are Plaintiff's claims of fraud barred by the statute of 
limitations? 
Answer: Yes No/ 
Question No.2: Did Kenneth Rammell commit fraud? 
Answer: Yes ~ No ---
Question No.3: Did Christa Beguesse, Inc. commit fraud? 
Answer: Yes / No __ _ 
Question No. 4: Did Christa Beguesse commit fraud? 
Answer: Yes / No ---
VERDICT FORM - 1 
40D 
y 
If you answered "yes" to questions 2, 3 or 4, answer Question No.5. If you answered 
"no" to questions 2, 3, and 4, proceed to Question No. 6. 
Question No.5. What is the total amount of damages to Plaintiff proximately 




Question No. 6: Is Plaintiffs breach of contract and warranty claim as to a library 
of files barred by the statute of limitations? 
Answer: Yes NoV 
Question No.7. Did Christa Beguesse, Inc. breach its contract and/or warranty 
with Plaintiff as to a library of files? 
Answer: Yes V No ---
If you answered "yes" to Question No.7, proceed to Question No.8. If you 
answered "no" to Question No.7, proceed to Question No.9. 
Question No.8. What is the total amount of damages to Plaintiff proximately 




Question No.9. Is Plaintiffs breach of contract and warranty claim as to 
proprietary software barred by the statute of limitations? 
Answer: Yes No/ 
. Question No. 10. Did Christa Beguesse, Inc. breach its contract and/or warranty 
with Plaintiff as to proprietary software? 
Answer: Yes V No ---
410 
VERDICT FORM - 2 
If you answered "yes" to Question No. 10, proceed to Question No. 11. If you 
answered "no" to Question 10, proceed to Question No. 12. 
Question No. 11. What is the total amount of damages to Plaintiff proximately 
caused by the breach of contract and/or warranty as to proprietary software, not otherwise 
awarded above? 
$C) 
SECTION II- CBI'S CLAIM. 
Question No. 12. Did April Beguesse, Inc. breach its contract with Christa Beguesse, 
Inc.? 
Answer: Yes -- No_L 
If you answered "yes" to Question No. 12, answer Question No. 13. If you 
answered "no" to Question 12, sign the verdict form and inform the bailiff that you are 
done. 
Question No. 13. What is the total amount of damages to Christa Beguesse, Inc., 
proximately caused by the breach of contract? 
ril,2~-:;-jf 
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VERDICT FORM - 3 
412 
VERDICT FORM - 4 
,y 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDIS:£4.L Ql~T,I}IGT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 6F ~~Vrfr12 




KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual, 
CHRJSTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, THE ESTATE OF CHIRISTA 
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by it qualified 
personal representative, Kenneth Rarnmell, 
Defendants/Counterclaimant. 
Case No. CV-09-2767 
JUDGMENT UPON VERDICT 
THIS MATTER having gone to trial on April 10-13, 2012, and the jury having 
returned a verdict, and good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff shall have judgment 
against defendants, joint and several, in the amount of$354,000. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that m addition to the 
foregoing, Plaintiff shall have judgment against Defendant Christa Beguesse, Inc., in the 
amount of $190,013. Interest shall accrue on the foregoing amounts at the statutory rate. 
Pursuant to the jury verdict, the counterclaim of Defendant Christa Beguesse, Inc is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated this 17 day of April, 20 li. 
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JUDGMENT UPON VERDICT- 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this [1 day of April, 201 ~I did send a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document upde parties listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon, or by placement in the courthouse mailbox. 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
BEARD ST.CLAIR GAFFNEY 
21 05 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
David E. Alexander 
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
JUDGMENT UPON VERDICT- 2 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
By jtyW_/ 
Deputy Clerk 
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